Cornell Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 3 March 1983

Article 1

Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren
and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort
Diane L. Zimmerman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291 (1983)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol68/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

REQUIEM FOR A HEAVYWEIGHT: A
FAREWELL TO WARREN AND BRANDEIS'S
PRIVACY TORT
Diane L. Zimmermant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................

292

I. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO BE FREE OF TRUE BUT
A. The Original Warren-Brandeis Formulation ..........
B. The Expansion of the Right to Privacy ...............
C. The Elements of the Private-Facts Tort ...............
D. The Supreme Court and the Private-Facts Tort .......

294
295
296
299
303

THE HISTORY OF PROTECTING TRUTHFUL SPEECH .......

306

EMBARRASSING PUBLICITY ................................

II.

A. The Framers' Intent: A Study of Truth as a Defense
to Defamation Preceding the Adoption of the First
Amendment ..........................................
B. The Supreme Court's Protection of Truthful Speech in
Modem Case Law ....................................
1. The Fault Standardin Defamation Cases Requires a
Defense of Truth ....................................
2. The Court's Disapprovalof Subjective Standards in
Restricting Speech ...................................
III.

COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE PRIVATE-FACTS TORT .....

A.

The Substantiality of the Interests Protected by the
Privacy Tort ..........................................
1. The Problems Associated with CompensatingEmotional
Harm .............................................
2. A Casefor the Positive Value of Gossip ................
a. Gossipfrom.a HistoricalPerspective ................

306
311
311
316
320

321
324
326
327

t
Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1963, Beaver College; J.D., 1976 Columbia University.
The author gives sincere thanks to the numerous colleagues who were so generous with
their time and so thoughtful in their comments during the preparation of this article. In
particular, appreciation is due to Harry First, Eleanor Fox, Beatrice Frank, William Nelson,
David Richards, and Joan Wexler for their insights and patience. The author would also like
to commend New York University law students Lani A. Adler, Randall Farrar, Ellen Rosen,
and Jane L. Vris for their able contributions to the legal research. This article was funded by
grants from the New York University Law Center Foundation.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:291

b. The Function and Persistence of Gossip in Contempora Life .......................................
332
B. The Mass-Communication Element: An Attempt to
Avoid More of the Right to Privacy Than Society Can
Afford ................................................
337
IV.

THE POSSIBILITY THAT A NARROW RIGHT TO RECOVER
FOR PUBLICATION OF PERSONAL FACTS COULD BE PRESERVED, CONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

....

A. Private Information: The Various Tests ..............
1. The Status of the Plaintiffas a Gauge ofPrivate
Information .........................................
2. Location Analysis as a Means of Defining Private
Information .........................................
3. The "Subject Matter" Test of PrivateFacts ............
B. The Newsworthiness Defense ..........................
1. Attempts to Define Newsworthiness: The PoliticalSpeech
M odel .............................................
2. The Leave-it-to-the-PressModel .......................
3. Passage of Time and the Erosion of Newsworthiness .....
4. Naming Names as a Gauge of Liability ................
5. The Unconscionability Standard .......................

341

344
344
347
348
350
351
353
355
356
358

CONCLUSION ...................................................

362

APPENDIX ......................................................

365

INTRODUCTION

In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis stirred the American
legal community with a ringing call to arms to protect the hapless citizenry against the truthful exposure of their personal affairs on the pages
of the "yellow press."' Warren and Brandeis dubbed the protection
they proposed a "right to privacy," and described it as the right "to be
let alone."'2 Their advocacy of this new tort created a minor revolution
in the development of the common law.
Nonetheless, even after ninety years, the real impact of that revolution on legislatures and courts is hard to evaluate. Depending upon the
biases of the viewer, the article's effect could be said to exemplify the
power, the impotence, or even the perniciousness of legal scholarship.
Those who assert that the impact of the article demonstrates the power
of scholarship point out that the Warren-Brandeis argument led most
states in this country to recognize a right to recover in tort for the
wrongful public exposure of private information,3 as well as for a wide
I Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy; 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2 Id at 193, 195 (quoting T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
3 It is not always clear whether a state recognizes a cause of action for publication of
private facts. Although some state courts have entertained actions for publication of private
facts, they have decided against the plaintiff without expressly ruling on whether a plaintiff
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range of other invasions of privacy.4
The impotence argument contends, however, that despite the everincreasing number of claims under the Warren-Brandeis theory, plaintiffs rarely win. One frustrated judge exclaimed in an impassioned dissent that if a right to be protected against the publication of truthful
information indeed existed within his state, his colleagues should honor
it "by more than lip service." 5
Finally, one can argue that the Warren-Brandeis contribution has
actually had a pernicious influence on modern tort law because it created a cause of action that, however formulated, cannot coexist with
constitutional protections for freedom of speech and press.
The constitutional dilemma posed by the Warren-Brandeis tort inevitably implicates the companion problem of the failure of this branch
of law to protect plaintiffs. The confusion that has attended the effort to
create a firm legal contour for the tort 6 merely reflects the inherent difficulty under the first amendment of treating truthful speech as tortious.
The Warren-Brandeis tort posits a legal power to control the flow of
information about one's self to other people-the right to govern authoritatively both the nature of personal information exposed to public
view and the conditions under which others may discuss those personal
facts. Yet even the most enthusiastic advocates of a right to privacy,
including Warren and Brandeis, recognized that any absolute protec7
tion of such an interest would intolerably hamper human discourse.
From the outset, advocates of privacy have thus faced a dual, and
sometimes internally inconsistent, task. On the one hand, they needed
to develop a philosophical basis to support the right through an exploration of why a civilized and humane society should recognize and protect
an interest in controlling public discussion of personal information. On
who met the requirements of the tort could succeed. Thirty-six jurisdictions, however, appear
to recognize the private-facts cause of action, while four explicitly reject it and other jurisdictions have no, or contradictory, rulings on the issue. See infra Appendix.
4
States have subsumed a variety of causes of action under the general heading of the
common law right to privacy. Among these are causes of action for commercial misappropriation of name or likeness, intrusion, and placing the plaintiff in a false light. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802-18 (4th
ed. 1971); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950); see infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
5
Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 829, 76 N.W.2d 762, 769
(1956) (Larson, C.J., dissenting). In a survey of state case law, the author found fewer than 18
cases in which a plaintiff was either awarded damages or found to have stated a cause of
action sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.
6
For criticism of the tort as hopelessly vague, see Kalven, Privaey in Tort Law--Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); see also Comment, .Pnvary, Defamation, and theFirst Amendment: The Implications of Time,Inc. v.Hill, 67 COLUM. L.
Rnv. 926, 940 (1967) (describing the private-facts tort as "amorphous").
7
See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190,202-04,50 S.E. 68, 73-74
(1905) (the first state case to adopt a right to privacy); Pound, Interestsof Personality, 28 HARv.
L. REv. 343, 363 (1915); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-16.
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the other hand, they had to protect free speech by creating numerous
defenses and narrowing the scope of the privacy tort, so that much personal information could circulate without penalty.
The challenge of harmonizing privacy with free speech has attracted many outstanding scholars of tort and constitutional law. 8 The
moral force of the privacy argument has compelled most commentators
to attempt to entrench the private-facts tort firmly in modern law.
They have stated the case in favor of the Warren-Brandeis right of privacy eloquently and forcefully. In their attempt to justify the tort, however, they have often underplayed its serious constitutional problems
and have overlooked the fact that genuine social values are served by
encouraging a free exchange 6f personal information. This article seeks
not to restate what has already been argued so well in favor of the private-facts tort, but, by presenting the opposite view, to encourage a reevaluation of the prevailing doctrine. Is it possible that the seemingly
elegant vessel that Warren and Brandeis set afloat some nine decades
ago is in fact a leaky ship which should at long last be scuttled?
I
THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO BE FREE OF TRUE BUT
EMBARRASSING PUBLICITY

Since Warren and Brandeis first expounded the view that a right to
privacy deserves the protection of the law, the nature of the right has
expanded significantly. Lawyers and philosophers have generated a
vast literature on the subject without being able to agree upon some
core of values or interests common to each of the cases in which the
"right to privacy" has been applied. 9 A part of the difficulty is that the
8 Eg., Bloustein, Pivacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty
and Unconstitutionalas Well , 46 TEx. L. REV. 611 (1968); Franklin, A ConstitutionalProblem in
n"ivag Protection. Legallnhibtionson ReportingofFact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107 (1963); Pound, The
'FourteenthAmendment and the Right oftivaqy 13 W. RS. L. REV. 34 (1961); Prosser, Privaey, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
9 One commentator recently stated that "[t]he long search for a 'definition' of 'privacy'
has produced a continuing debate that is often sterile and, ultimately, futile." Wacks, The
Poverty of 'rivay," 96 LAw Q. REV. 73, 75 (1980). Since the original Warren-Brandeis effort
to define privacy, numerous writers have tried to define the term. Prosser divided the right of
privacy into at least four distinct interests. See Prosser, .wpra note 8, at 389; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (adopting Prosser's formulation). In contrast, Bloustein
argued that a unitary interest in the preservation of human dignity underlies all privacy law.
See Bloustein, Pivay as an Aspect ofHuman Digniy: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 962 (1964). See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (criticized in
Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarificationof Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 695-700 (1972));
Gavison, Priva, and the Limits ofthe Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Konvitz, tivaq andthe Law:
A PhilosophicalPrelude, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 272, 279-80 (1966); Shils, .Pniacy Its
Constitutionand Vicissitudes, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 281 (1966). An interesting discussion
of the variable meanings of privacy over time and across cultures is found in Velecky, The
Concept oftiva , in PRIVACY 13-34 (J. Young ed. 1978). Perhaps the best summation of the
problem of defining privacy is contained in one witty remark: "[P]rivacy, like an elephant, is

1983]

WARREN-BRANDEIS PRIVACY TORT

phrase today is a catch-all, attached to a broad range of interests which
often have little or nothing to do with the tort originally envisioned by
Warren and Brandeis. This article, therefore, begins with a retrospective look at the development of privacy law. Perhaps, sorting out the
major legal interests that conglomerate under the general heading of a
"right to privacy," will bring the private-facts tort-the sole concern of
this study-into sharper focus.
A.

The Original Warren-Brandeis Formulation

In the original Warren-Brandeis formulation, the phrase "right to
privacy" referred to a right not to have information about one's personal
life exposed to the general public by the press 0-- the private-facts
branch of tort law. The authors never specifically defined the kinds of
information that they believed the law should protect. Their primary
standard appears to have been the personal tastes and preferences of the
individual plaintiff,I ' and they therefore did not require that the actionable information be especially intimate, or particularly offensive by objective standards.' 2 They seemed instead to believe that the details of
one's personal life "belonged" in some sense to the individual and could
not be "used" by others without permission.
The circumstances that are said to have inspired the article may
demonstrate the types of information, and the breadth of the right, that
the authors wanted to protect. Proper Bostonians of the 1890s regarded
the appearance of their names in the newspapers as a disgrace.' 3 Much
speculation exists that anger over news accounts of the social life of War. . .more readily recongized [sic] than described." Young, Introduction: A Look at Piva, in
PRIVACY 2 (J. Young ed. 1978).
10 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195-96.
11 Analogizing the privacy right to the common law copyright, Warren and Brandeis
wrote:

The common law secures to each individual the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others. Under our system of government, he can never be
compelled to express them (except when upon the witness-stand); and even if
he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix

the limits of the publicity which shall be given them.
Id at 198 (footnote omitted).
12 Although the authors disapproved of newspaper stories that describe "sexual relations," id at 196, and "the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors," id, they made clear
that all "gossip," however innocuous, is equally objectionable:
Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is
potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the
relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a
people.
Id
13

See i; see also A. WESTIN, supra note 9, at 348 ("For the patricians, the gossip press,

commercial advertising, and exposure of the doings of the socially prominent were aggressive
and unjustified intrusions by publishers pandering to 'mass' curiosity and tastes."); Barron,
Warren andBrandeis, The Right to ftvagy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890): Drrnystiffing a Landmark
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ren and his wife led Warren to solicit Brandeis to coauthor the law review article.' 4 In 1890, two newspapers carried items in their gossip
columns describing in rather restrained tones a wedding breakfast held
by the Warrens for a cousin and her new husband.' 5 This sort of nonintimate coverage may have been what induced the authors to lament:
"To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip,
6
which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle."'
B.

The Expansion of the Right to Privacy

After the article appeared, courts and legislatures began to apply
the label "right to privacy" expansively to situations that bore little resemblance to those encompassed in the vague Warren-Brandeis formulation. By 1960, Dean Prosser found that he could identify, in addition
to cases clearly in the Warren-Brandeis mold, at least three other distinct torts commonly labeled invasions of privacy.1 7 One of them, the
tort of intrusion, is the easiest to analogize to the private-facts tort because it occurs when a defendant breaches a plaintiff's commonly
respected expectation of seclusion.' 8 Most people anticipate that no one
will open their personal mail without permission. Similarly, individuals
expect that others will not spy on what they do behind the closed doors
of their home. A defendant who steams open another's letters or "bugs"
another's bedroom violates normal expectations about what will not be
exposed to public view, and therefore invades another's privacy as that
term is commonly understood.' 9
The other two categories recognized by tort law touch less closely
on the interest in privacy as an expectation of seclusion. "False-light"
privacy cases involve publicized misinformation that creates a false impression about an individual's life or behavior.20 The information need
not be degrading or intimate; it could, in fact, present the plaintiff more
favorably than reality warrants. 2 1 The gravamen of the "false-light" ofCitation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 875, 904 (1979) ("Proper Bostonians did not want to be the
subjects of any reports they could not control.").
14 See, e.g., Barron, supra note 13, at 891-93; Kalven, supra note 6, at 329 n.22; Prosser,
supra note 8. But see D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 23-25 (1972) (rejecting the contention that press coverage of the

wedding of Warren's daughter led to the article, but concluding that the genesis of the article
"lay in
15
16
17

Warren's Boston social life').
See Barron, supra note 13, at 893-94.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
See Prosser, supra note 8, at 389-407.

18 The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted Dean Prosser's four categories of privacy
torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977). Intrusion is discussed in
§ 652B.
19

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment b (1977).

20 See id § 652E.
21 The Restatement Second formulation requires the false-light publicity to be "highly offensive to a reasonable person," id comment c, but seems to intend that the misrepresentation
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fense is that publication of misinformation injures the plaintiff's dignity.
Prosser's final tort law category treats appropriation of a name or likeness for commercial purposes as an invasion of privacy, although this
tort does not involve an interest in seclusion or protection of intimate
information. The misappropriation tort protects one's property right in
the economic benefit derived from the commercial exploitation of one's
face or name.

22

Courts have also applied the term "right to privacy" to cases that
limit the actions of creditors in the collection of debts 23 and to cases that

protect against misuse of information in data banks. 24 All these fact
patterns have one common element: they revolve around obtaining or
exchanging data about another person without that person's consent.
The Supreme Court has also adopted the "right to privacy" term,
be of a major nature, and not merely untrue in some trivial details. The fact pattern in Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), typifies these cases. In Hil, a family won damages in state
court for an incorrect but flattering portrayal of an incident in which they resisted escaped
convicts who held them hostage in their home. The Supreme Court reversed because the
inaccuracies were printed neither knowingly nor recklessly, not because the revelations were
inoffensive.
22

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment a (1977).

23 Courts have treated claims that creditors' debt collection methods invaded the privacy of a debtor as a subspecies of the private-facts tort. See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) (creditor's requesting debtor's employer to withhold
wages not invasion of privacy); Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 130,
339 N.E.2d 274 (1975) (recognizing tort of invasion of privacy through public disclosure of
private debt); Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962). But many courts look
to whether the creditor's conduct constitutes harassment or a pattern of outrageous conduct,
and many grant relief under this analysis even when elements of the private-facts tort, such as
widespread publicity of the debt, have not been satisfied. See, e.g., Booty v. American Fin.
Corp., 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 1969) (Louisiana requires evidence of coercive conduct on
part of creditor); Leonard v. Pioneer Fin. Co., 568 S.W.2d 937 (Mo. App. 1978) (requiring
showing of intolerable, outrageous conduct by creditor); Jackson v. People's Fed. Credit
Union, 25 Wash. App. 81, 604 P.2d 1025 (1979) (tort of outrage designed to protect privacy).
Because courts in outrageous debt collection cases have often departed from the elements
required in the private-facts tort, we should regard these cases as a separate category of the
common law invasion of privacy. It should also be noted that creditor behavior is increasingly becoming subject to legislative regulation. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1788.10-.16
(West Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 427.101-.105 (West 1974).
24 American courts have labeled a number of other situations as invasions of privacy.
See, e.g., Senogles v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 217 Kan. 438, 536 P.2d 1358 (1975) (insurance company sued for submitting plaintiff's health data to organization that evaluates insurance risks); Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 208 Kan. 909, 494 P.2d 1063 (1972) (plaintiff'sued
employer for submitting to plaintiff's union a "confession" of wrongdoing on job); Klump v.
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermkts., Inc., 376 So. 2d 514 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (invasion of
privacy claim based on communication by defendant of information to plaintiff's employer);
Claspill v. Craig, 586 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (privacy claim against union that
publicized resignation of certain members). For a discussion of the range of modern privacy
problems, including misuse of data banks and computers, electronic eavesdropping, industrial
espionage, polygraphs, and psychological testing, see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, CMD. 5, No. 5012 (1972); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA
BANKS AND DOSSIERS (1971); A. WESTIN, supra note 9; Miller, The Fhioaey Revolution: A Report

from the Barricades, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1979).
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using it in the constitutional context to describe certain protections of
personal autonomy against governmental interference. For example,
the Court has repeatedly referred to the fourth amendment right to be
free of warrantless searches as a right to privacy. 25 The claims of individuals to be free of governmental constraints in choosing whether to
use birth control 26 or to seek abortions during the early stages of preg'27
nancy are similarly grounded in a constitutional "right to privacy.
Although the constitutional privacy cases may address expectations of
seclusion and protect very intimate and personal areas of life, just as the
Warren-Brandeis tort does, the existence and the contours of the constitutional right to privacy reveal little about whether and when a corol28
lary interest should be protected against invasion in ordinary tort law.

Whereas the Constitution insulates individuals from governmental intrusion in their private lives, it does not dictate rights between private
citizens.29 Although we may be tempted to accord individuals the same
25 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 967 (1978) ("The fourth amendment more than any other explicit
constitutional provision reflects the existence of [some right to privacy and personhood].").
26 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
27 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
28 The case law rarely discusses the distinction between the constitutional right to privacy and the common law right, although courts occasionally mention it in passing. See, e.g.,
Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326 n.14, 327 n.17 (2d Cir. 1978) (suggesting a
distinction between common law and constitutional privacy claims); Drake v. Covington
County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 980 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (Johnson, CJ., concurring)
("[T]he Warren-Brandeis right of privacy. . . is a creature of state law and is not constitutionally based."); Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862, 865 n.5 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (distinguishing the right to be free from unwanted publicity from constitutional
privacy cases).
In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), the Supreme Court suggested that the constitutional right to privacy is limited to cases involving abuse of government power by "unreasonable" searches or in "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education." Thus, courts may not extend the constitutional right to privacy to encompass unwanted publicity by public officials, even when the
plaintiff proves damage to reputation. But see id at 735 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A
host of. . . courts, relying on both privacy notions and the presumption of innocence, have
[held] that there are substantive limits on the power of the government to disseminate unresolved arrest records. . . .'); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413-15 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that right to privacy is a "basic right" of constitutional dimension,
whether the defendant is a private party or a government official); W. PROSSER, supra note 4,
at 816 (suggesting some undefined relationship between constitutional right to privacy and
tort law in privacy area).
29 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court
distinguished the constitutional rights to privacy from similar common law rights when it
recognized a cause of action for damages against defendants for an unlawful search of plaintiff's home:
Respondents seek to treat the relationship between a citizen and a federal
agent unconstitutionally exercising his authoity as no different from the relationship between two private citizens. . . . An agent acting--albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity
for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his
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protection from their neighbor's prying as the Constitution provides
against governmental invasions, such an equation conflicts both with
the historical distinction between constitutional and common law and
with the first amendment rights of our neighbors.
The broad range of situations covered by the term "right to privacy" may seem to add luster to the concept, and association with constitutionally protected interests may add an authoritative ring to the
phrase; yet as a descriptive or analytic term, "right to privacy" is virtually meaningless. Little that has been said about privacy in its vague,
general sense, or that has been said about specific categories of privacy
cases adequately confronts the basic tension the original Warren-Brandeis private-facts tort creates between constitutional and social values.
Conversely, discussion of the private-facts tort does not necessarily implicate the viability or constitutionality of other "privacy" rights.30
C. The Elements of the Private-Facts Tort
The elements of the private-facts tort vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The formulation of the Restatement (Second) of
*Torts,however, is widely relied upon by the courts and provides a useful
general summary of the law. 31 The Restatement requires the plaintiff in a
private-facts case to show that the information was private3 2 and that
own. ...
Accordingly, as our cases make clear, the Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether
the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen.
Id at 391-92.
30 This article will not address the separate problem of publication of tortiously obtained private information. The press's procurement of information by trespass, intrusion

through eavesdropping, or other forms of surreptitious surveillance constitutes a potential
source of liability. Whether the publication of information thus obtained should provide a
separate ground for liability is complex and beyond the scope of this article.
A related and more difficult problem is the treatment of cases in which a publisher receives private information with reason to know that it has been obtained by the tortious acts
of third persons. Although cases have not focused clearly on the distinction between intrusion
and publication, some courts permit publication of information, even where unlawfully obtained. Set, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[I]n analyzing a
claimed breach of privacy, injuries from intrusion and injuries from publication should be
kept clearly separate."). But see Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 250 (9th Cir. 1971)
(publication may be taken into account in assessing damages for the intrusion itself). See
generaly D. GILLMORE & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 335-51 (3d ed. 1979);
Rubin, ReportersKeep Out, 1979 COLUM. JOURNALISM RaV. 47 (discussing problems faced by
journalists).
31
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
32 See id comment b. The Restatement Second defines private information as that which
the ordinary person would find highly personal and the disclosure of which would offend a
person of ordinary sensibilities. Thus the Restatement Second, by establishing an objective, reasonable person standard, limits the tort to a range of communications narrower than did
either Warren and Brandeis or some of the state courts. See supra notes 11- 16 and accompanying text. Although courts generally purport to use an objective, reasonable person standard,
their decisions cast doubt on whether they have actually done so. In Cason v. Baskin, 155
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the defendant disseminated the information widely. 33 The defendant

may defeat the action by showing that the public has a legitimate inter34
est in the disclosed facts.
Even a casual glance at the elements of the tort and at the "newsworthiness" defense reveals several immediate legal difficulties. First,
the widespread-publicity element of the cause of action targets the mass
media for liability; except for highly unusual fact situations, individual
nonmedia defendants will rarely satisfy the requirement. 35 This element
of the cause of action comports entirely with the original Warren-Brandeis theory, which was explicitly designed to protect against the indis-

Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a reasonable person
could find that the defendant had invaded the plaintiff's privacy even though, "considered as
a whole, [the book] portrays the plaintiff as a fine and attractive personality." Id at 207, 20
So. 2d at 247. The Cason court noted that although many people would enjoy publicity, to
some "it is extremely distasteful, disturbing and painful." Id at 205, 20 So. 2d at 246; cf.
Jeppson v. United Television, Inc., 580 P.2d 1087, 1089-90 (Utah 1978) (Crockett, J., dissenting) (plaintiff's right to privacy not invaded, in dissent's view, by television show, "Dialing for
Dollars," because reasonable person with listed phone number would not be offended by
courteous call offering prize); see also Karaflol, The Right to Privaq and the Sidis Case, 12 GA. L.
REv. 513, 525 (1978) (urging courts to consider injury to plaintiff's feelings and not merely
offensiveness to the "reasonable person" when assessing private-facts tort cases).
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
34 Id comment d. Because courts soon recognized that broad tort liability for truthful
speech could pose serious first amendment problems, they felt constrained to treat disclosures
as immunized or privileged if they were newsworthy. All jurisdictions that recognize the
private-facts tort have adopted the newsworthiness defense. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (first case to adopt a common law right to
privacy). In its opinion, the court cautioned:
The right of privacy is unquestionably limited by the right to speak and print.
It may be said that to give liberty of speech and of the press such wide scope
as has been indicated would impose a very serious limitation upon the right of
privacy; but if it does, it is due to the fact that the law considers that the
welfare of the public is better subserved by maintaining the liberty of speech
and of the press than by allowing an individual to assert his right of privacy in
such a way as to interfere with the free expression of one's sentiments and the
publication of every matter in which the public may be legitimately
interested.
Id at 204, 50 S.E. at 74.
35 When it is confined to a small group, or communicated to other individuals over a
long period of time, most jurisdictions exempt private, person-to-person gossip from liability.
A nonmedia defendant who spread the offensive information to a wide audience has
occasionally satisfied the mass-publicity requirement. See, e.g., Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962) (creditor stripped plaintiffs car of tires in employer's parking lot causing plaintiff to become butt of coworker's jokes and derision); Brents
v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (auto repair shop owner posted billboard-size
notice of plaintiffs failure to pay bill in window on main street of town); Lambert v. Dow
Chem. Co., 215 So. 2d 673 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (company's showing photographs of injured
employee undergoing surgery to other plant employees at safety meeting constituted widespread publicity); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959) (bill
collector repeatedly and loudly demanded payment in front of customers in restaurant where
plaintiff worked).
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cretions of the press, not those of the drawing room. 36 Yet, the existence

of the mass-publication requirement immediately taints the tort because
it suggests that in this area the press has significantly less freedom of
speech than does a private individual. The Supreme Court has often
said that the press has no more rights than individual speakers; 37 but it
has never held that the press enjoys less protection than individuals
under the first amendment or that its special role as mass communicator
38
can subject it to special burdens.
Second, both the elements of the tort and the newsworthiness defense have remained so conceptually vague that they offer little gui39
dance to the judges and jurors who must decide private-facts cases.
What sorts of information should be deemed personal or private? The
failure of the Restatement to fix clear boundaries illustrates the dilemma.
It ultimately retreats into such vagaries as "common decency" 40 and a
reasonable person's perception of the line between what the public is
entitled to know and what is merely a "morbid and sensational prying
into private lives for its own sake."'4 1 Other areas of tort law are, of
course, rife with equally vague standards, and frequently draw lines between tortious and nontortious conduct based on the actions and perRecent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step
which must be taken for the protection of the person . . . . Instantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life. . . . For years there has been a feeling that the
law must afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of
private persons; and the evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers,
long keenly felt, has been but recently discussed by an able writer.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 (footnotes omitted). The authors voiced concern
with the behavior of the press, which was "overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds
of propriety and of decency." Id at 196.
37 See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) ("no First Amendment right of access
to information"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-35 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972); see also Blanchard, The InstitutionalPress andItr FirstAmendment Pvileges, 1978 Sup. Cr. REv. 225, 227 ("'hestandard for measuring press claims has remained
focused on the freedom of the individual to speak.").
38 Although dictum in Branzburg intimated that the media was more restricted than
individuals in their coverage of criminal trials, the Court elsewhere rejected the suggestion
that the media's freedom of speech is more restricted than that enjoyed by the general public.
See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974); accord Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 594 n.21 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
39 Commentators have discussed the ambiguity of the private-facts tort and many have
attempted to offer solutions that would more specifically define its contours. See, e.g., Emerson, The Right ofprivacy andFreedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329 (1979); Hill,
Defamation and Privac Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1255-69 (1976)
(attempting to clarify the decisions interpreting the tort); Wright, Defamation, Privaq, and the
Public's Right to Know: A National Poblem and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REv. 630 (1968);
Comment, First Amendment Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 180
(1977). But ef. Kalven, supra note 6 (arguing against expansion of the tort).
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment h (1977).
36

41

Id
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ceptions of the so-called reasonable person. 42 Ambiguous standards in a
tort that infringes upon first amendment interests, however, become inherently suspect. Clearly, the application of standards that depend on
local mores43 easily could lead to widely divergent outcomes in factually
similar cases among jurisdictions and even among different courts
within a single jurisdiction. 44

Similar difficulties have plagued courts' attempts to define the privilege of newsworthiness that excuses the publication of private and embarrassing information. 45 Courts have, for example, clumsily grappled
42 See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 4, §§ 32-33 (the reasonable person test in the law of
negligence).
43 But ef. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (approving use of "contemporary community standards" to decide when sexually explicit material is "obscene" and can be prohibited). Miller does not suggest, however, that the Court transfer its reliance on local mores to
other speech areas, such as tortious invasion of privacy. Arguably, the Court's approach to
obscenity and the first amendment is suigeneri, and constitutes a tentative compromise at
best. The Court's willingness to proscribe obscene speech seems to derive in part from the
notion that obscene expression is entitled to no first amendment protection, and from the
relative ease with which obscene and nonobscene speech can be distinguished. Moreover, the
Court appears to believe that even borderline, nonobscene pornographic materials, although
constitutionally protected, are unimportant in a scheme of free speech protection and that
their regulation does no serious harm to constitutional values. See, e.g., Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion); see also infta note 269.
These arguments are difficult to apply to speech that invades privacy. Unlike obscenity
which is limited to explicit sexuality, "private" facts are harder to single out of the general
realm of expression because they involve a tremendous range of different kinds of information. See infra notes 295-307 and accompanying text. In addition, the press publishes information subject to privacy objections precisely because, in the opinion of the press, the
material is a traditional subject of public concern and debate. In contrast, the law has traditionally regarded society as better served when explicit sexual materials are suppressed entirely or, at least, contemplated only in the innermost recesses of the home. Hence, in the
realm of privacy, unlike in the area of pornography, public importance (i.e., "newsworthiness") is a major countervailing force to the demand for regulation. See infra notes 308-44 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, some courts have expressly approved of the use of community standards in deciding what is newsworthy, and have said that the determination should
be made by ajury. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 998 (1976); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
44 Compare, e.g., Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948) (court denied plaintiff's recovery for defendant's reporting on custody hearing and
scandalous evidence because of wide diversity of opinion over what is "legitimate" to print)
with Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959) (story about man who
married younger woman to spite her parents and about the ensuing divorce constitutes entertainment, not news, and reasonable person might find story offensive); Compare also Howard v. Des Moines Register Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 303-04 (Iowa 1979), cerl. denied, 445
U.S. 904 (1980) (publication of plaintiff's name in news story about her involuntary sterilization not tortious invasion of privacy) with Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1206-07, 159
S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942) and Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 292, 297 P. 91, 93-94 (1931)
(publication of plaintiff's name in movie about her unsavory early life unnecessary and tortious invasion of privacy). See generally Ashdown, Media Reportingand Privaq Claims-Declinein
ConstitutionalProtectionfor the Press, 66 Ky. L.J. 759, 778 (1978) (standard of care in privacy
area established by "nebulous concepts of sociopolitical relevance and offensiveness"); Hill,
supra note 39, at 1269 (noting fear that application of standard of extreme offensiveness by
jury would invite jury to act as "censors").
45 See infra notes 308-65 and accompanying text.
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with whether the public status of the plaintiff is relevant to a finding of
newsworthiness.4 6 They have struggled to distinguish between nonnews47
worthy information and that which the public "legitimately" needs.
Many courts, despairing of their ability to make such determinations in
a principled way, have ultimately deferred to the media's judgment of
what is and is not newsworthy. As a result, the privilege in some jurisdictions has had the practical effect of demolishing the tort. 48
Yet, despite the definitional and constitutional pitfalls that have
plagued the Warren-Brandeis tort, virtually all jurisdictions that have
ruled on the matter have found that, at least theoretically, a state may
49
protect its citizens against public exposure of private facts.
D.

The Supreme Court and the Private-Facts Tort

The Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled on whether the private-facts cause of action is a constitutionally permissible vehicle for the
protection of privacy rights.50 In only one instance, Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 5 1 has the Court ever decided a private-facts case. 52 Cox
46 See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
47 See infia notes 308-65 and accompanying text.
48 Henry Kalven, observing the tendency of the newsworthiness defense to obliterate the
private-facts tort, quipped "[tihe [privacy] mountain . . . has brought forth a pretty small
mouse." Kalven, supra note 6, at 337.
49 Some states have refused to adopt the private-facts tort. See infra Appendix. Of these,
the Nebraska Supreme Court has come closest to an expression of skepticism about the legal
legitimacy of the tort:
We submit that if [a right to privacy] is deemed necessary or desirable, such
right should be provided for by action of our Legislature and not by judicial
legislation. . . . This is especially true in view of the nature of the right
under discussion, under which right not even the truth of the allegations is a
defense.
Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 525, 73 N.W.2d 803, 806 (1955).
50 The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy, and has intimated that states may recognize rights to privacy not grounded in the Constitution. The
Court, however, has not yet addressed the validity of the private-facts tort. See supra notes 2529 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). In his plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971), Justice Brennan
noted that libel law, which the Court has found reflects a valid state interest, protects privacy
as well as reputation. See infia text accompanying 345-48.
51 420 U.S. 469 (1975). A Georgia statute made the publication of a rape victim's name
a misdemeanor.
It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print and
publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other medium of public dissemination or cause to be printed and published, broadcast, televised, or
disseminated in any newspaper, magazine, periodical or other publication
published in this State or through any radio or television broadcast originating in the State the name or identity of any female who may have been raped
or upon whom an assault with intent to commit rape may have been made.
Any person or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction, be punished as for a misdemeanor.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-990 (1972), reprinted in Cox, 420 U.S. at 471 n.1. The victim's father
claimed that under either the statute or the common law, his privacy was invaded by the
publicity given to his dead daughter's identity. See 420 U.S. at 474.
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involved the truthful publication, of a rape victim's name,53 and posed
for the Court, in its words; the 91-rt of case in which "claims of privacy
most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and
press."'54 Because the material divulged in Cox was obtained from publicly available trial records, however, the Court avoided a resolution of
the constitutional dilemma; instead, it immunized the press against liability for accurate reports about matters contained in the public record. 55 The Court reasoned that when the government chooses to
include information in public records, it cannot then impose tort liability if individuals or the press choose to further publicize that already
public information.5 6 The Court, in creating this privilege, accorded no
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court recognized
the "privacy" tort of misappropriation of one's likeness for commercial reasons. See supra note
22 and accompanying text. In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974),
and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court addressed the "false-light" tort, comparing it to the tort of libel.
Although the majority opinion in Tne, Inc. v.Hill made clear that false-light privacy
actions are theoretically distinguishable from those for defamation, the Court also noted a
considerable overlap between the two torts. See 385 U.S. at 387-91. Many false-light cases
could equally well have been brought as libel cases:
Although not usually thought of in terms of "right of privacy," all libel cases
concern public exposure by false matter, but the primary harm being compensated is damage to reputation. In the "right of privacy" cases the primary
damage is the mental distress from having been exposed to public view, although injury to reputation may be an element bearing upon such damage.
Id at 385 n.9.
The Court in Hill held that the standard in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), for liability in false-light cases applies regardless of whether public or private
plaintiffs publicized the false information. The Court justified this conclusion on the ground
that "the constitutional guarantees [of free speech] can tolerate sanctions against calculated
falsehood without significant impairment of their essential function." 385 U.S. at 389. Thus,
false-light actions must satisfy a knowing-or-reckless disregard of falsity standard to permit
recovery. Accord Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
53
At issue in Cox was a broadcaster's divulgence of the name of a rape-murder victim,
obtained from the records of the trial court.
54
Cox, 420 U.S. at 489.
55
The Court noted that the problem of whether proscribing truthful publication comported with the Constitution was so troubling that "caution" needed to be used in deciding
the case:
Rather than address the broader question whether . . . the State may ever
define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the
press, it is appropriate to focus on the narrower interface between press and
privacy that this case presents, namely, whether the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from
public records. . ..
9
Id at 4 1.
56
The majority recognized a presumption that when the state made information part of
the public record, the state believed that the public interest was being served. See 420 U.S. at
495. The Court added, however, that the state could protect privacy, where necessary, by
prohibiting the release of certain information contained in public documents. See id at 496.
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weight to the probability that government bodies give little thought to
privacy questions when placing information in public records. Nor did
it deem relevant the fact that the public is rarely aware of most of the
information contained in so-called public records.5 7 The privilege for
truthful reports was absolute.
But the reach of the Cox holding is hard to measure. Cox rests in
part on the notion that first amendment values of free speech and press
are involved most intimately when the protected information concerns
government operations.5 8 It is difficult, therefore, to determine whether
Cox affects the constitutionality of a tort proscribing publication of
truthful facts gleaned from sources other than public records. As the
Court said: "Public records by their very nature are of interest to those
concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit
is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the records by the
media." 59 In contrast, information from sources other than public
records does not necessarily involve the "administration of government." We should not assume, however, that Cox would not apply to
such information. The Supreme Court has held that the first amendment protects speech generally, and not merely a narrowly defined category of political speech6 ° Moreover, the Court's second justification for
denying liability in Cox-the fear of a "chilling effect"--applies equally
well to any information that is of use to the general public in debating
and deciding issues of concern to the community. Cox reflects the
Court's concern that the nebulous distinction between permitted and
prohibited material would lead the media to suppress much important
information rather than risk future liability. 6 1 If this chilling-effect raThis approach is criticized as too simplistic by Hill, supra note 39, at 1267-68. For other
criticisms of the Cox decision, see Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 173-78,
584 P.2d 1310, 1313-18 (Ct. App. 1978) (SutinJ., specially concurring); Hill,supra note 39, at
1264-67; Karafiol, supra note 32, at 522.
57
The Court accepted without comment the proposition set out in comment c to
§ 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that information in "public records" is de facto
public. See 420 U.S. at 494.
58 420 U.S. at 495.
59

Id

See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (motion picture
cannot be banned merely because it is sacrilegious); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948) (first amendment protects not merely informational communications or the exposition
of ideas, but entertainment-oriented speech as well).
61
We are reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records
generally available to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the
sensibilities of the supposed reasonable man. Such a rule would make it very
difficult for the media to inform citizens about the public business and yet
stay within the law. The rule would invite timidity and self-censorship and
very likely lead to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be
published and that should be made available to the public.
420 U.S. at 496.
60

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:291

tionale is central to the Court's reasoning in Cox, by extension, all truthful speech should enjoy absolute protection from tort liability.
Although the Court has yet to rule on the validity of the privatefacts tort, there is much evidence to suggest that it will ultimately find
that body of law an unconstitutional restraint on speech. The history of
the first amendment neither supports nor justifies a system of tort liability for true speech. Indeed, case law in the closely related area of defamation strongly implies that the first amendment protects accurate
speech. 62 Furthermore, the policy justifications that underlie the private-facts tort embody a state interest not sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement of fundamental first amendment rights. 6 3 Based
on this evidence, Cox, properly read in the context of the Court's recent
64
decisions, mandates constitutional protection for true statements.
II
THE HISTORY OF PROTECTING TRUTHFUL SPEECH

A.

The Framers' Intent: A Study of Truth as a Defense to
Defamation Preceding the Adoption of the First
Amendment

The history of the common law of defamation provides a useful
point of departure for analysis. Although not dispositive, that history
may shed some light on the meaning of the first amendment and on the
intent of its framers-to the extent that any such intent may be discerned 6 -- and provide some insight into the impropriety of treating
truthful speech as tortious. The long tradition of allowing defamation
actions that preceded the adoption of the Bill of Rights, coupled with
the uniform acceptance of such causes of action by the original states,
suggest that the framers could not have expected the first amendment to
prohibit the punishment of false and injurious speech. 66 Privacy, in con62
63
64

See infra notes 99-117.
See infra notes 118-28.
For examples of situations in which true speech may not always be protected see infra

notes 98-117 and accompanying text & text accompanying notes 118-28.
65 Some historians argue that the framers merely intended that the first amendment act
as a limit on federal power, and did not mean it to embody any concrete notions of freedom
of speech. See generally M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 17-19 (1965); L.
LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 135-38 (1972); L.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 225-26 (1960); R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 106-25 (1955).
66 Justice White, in his dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
reviewed the history of defamation actions and concluded that the framers could not have
intended to prevent all punishment for libelous and false speech:
The Court does not contend, and it could hardly do so, that those who
wrote the First Amendment intended to prohibit the Federal Government,
within its sphere of influence in the Territories and the District of Columbia,
from providing the private citizen a peaceful remedy for damaging falsehood.
At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, many of the conse-
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trast, was not a recognized interest at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted. 67 And nothing in the history of the common law suggests even
a tacit acceptance on the part of the framers of civil liability for accurate
but personally embarrassing speech.o England has never recognized
the tort of invasion of privacy.69 Even the precedents relied, on by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 protected privacy interests only as an incident
to the recognition of some other independent interest, such as a property
70
right.
Indeed, despite some confusion in the sources, 7 1 English and early
American law seemed affirmatively to protect truthful but discreditable
speech, at least from civil liability. English sources, from the earliest up
until the adoption of the common law by the United States, recognized
truth as an absolute defense in tort actions for defamation. The defense
was not technical; rather, it seems to have reflected the prevailing view
that sound social policy precluded legal recognition of the harm caused
by speaking the truth.
The gravamen of the offense in defamation actions from their earliest appearance, long predating the development of English common
law, was harm to reputation through falsity. The Ninth Commandment
to Moses on Sinai proscribed bearing false witness against one's neighbor.7 2 The Old Testament Book of Psalms, too, is replete with invec-.

tives against those who spread false tales. 73 Roman law offered both
civil and criminal remedies against defamation, and in most cases seems
to have treated truth as a complete defense to the charge. 74 Likewise,
quences of libel law..

.

had developed. .

.

. [Ten] of the 14 States that had

ratified the Constitution by 1792 had themselves provided constitutional
guarantees for free expression, and 13 of the 14 nevertheless provided for the
prosecution of libels. Prior to the Revolution the American Colonies had
adopted the common law of libel.
Id at 380-81 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
67 Warren and Brandeis first advocated the right to privacy in 1890. See infra note 70
and accompanying text.
68 See generally Franklin, The Orign and Constitutionalityof Limitations on Truth as a Defense in
Tort Law, 16 STAN.L. REV. 789 (1963).
69 REPORT OF THE CoMmrrTEE ON PRIVACY, CMD. 5, No. 5012, at 25 (1972); see also
Wacks, supra note 9, at 73-74.
70 Warren and Brandeis relied primarily on precedents in the area of common law copyright, a property doctrine reserving to the author or creator of written, artistic, or other original work the initial right to control when and if it should be exposed to the public. See
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1,at 198-205. They also looked to certain cases which involved implied contracts, see id at 207-11, and to the law of trade secrets, see id at 212.
71
See infra notes 86-96.
72
Exodus 20:16 (King James).
73
In Psalns 35:11 (King James) the author laments: "False witnesses did rise up; they
laid to my charge things that I knew not." (Emphasis in original); see also id 35:20-21 ("For
they speak not peace: but they devise deceitful matters against them thatare quiet in the land.
Yea, they opened their mouth wide against me, and said, Aha, aha, our eye hath seen it.')
(Emphasis in original); id 5, 10, 14, 31, 34, 38, 52, 59 (King James).
74
The later phases of Roman law treated different kinds of defamation in different
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early English cases punished the spreading of lies about others; 75 but
none, apparently, provided penalties for spreading accurate but unflattering truths. 76 Ecclesiastical law remedied defamation by imposing on
the defamer the penance of public admission of the baselessness of his or
her statements. 77 The church seems, thus, to have focused only on unfounded gossip and appears to have been unconcerned with preventing
revelation of true character or behavior. By the time the common law
courts began to wrest jurisdiction over defamation from the church
courts in the sixteenth century, 78 the availability of truth as a complete
79
defense in civil actions was settled law.
By the time the first amendment was drafted, truth was not a defense in criminal defamation actions. History suggests, however, that it
had been a defense until the early seventeenth century.8 0 Beginning in
1275, England enacted successive criminal statutes-Scandalum
Magnatum-that prohibited defaming the lords and prelates of England.8 1 The statutes did not impose penalties for true statements, but
ways. Two civil actions were available. One action was for public insult, and truth was no
defense. Truth was a defense to the second action for damage to reputation. Criminal penalties were imposed by statute for certain widely publicized anonymous charges of serious
crimes against government officials (these offenses were called libelli famosi). Veeder, Hisloy
and Theog of Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 547, 563-65 (1903). Apparently proof of
truth, coupled with an admission of the author's identity, was at some times in Roman history
a complete defense to the criminal charge and at other times was not. The laws of Justinian,
for example, viewed an open and accurate accusation as a public benefit. M. NEWELL, THE
LAW OF DEFAMATION, LIBEL AND SLANDER 14 (1890); 1 T. STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF SLANDER AND LIBEL xxxv, n.w (2d Am. ed. J. Wendell ed. 1852).
75
The penalty for such lying was the loss of the malefactor's tongue, or the payment of a
substantial fine called wergeld. See 1 T. STARKIE, supra note 74, at xxxvi n.w; Donnelly,
Histoq, ofDefamation, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 99, 100 n.3; Veeder, supra note 74, at 549.
76 According to the statutes of Edgar, the loss of the tongue or the payment of a fine
occurred when "anyone seeks to accuse another man fasel, so that he is injured either in
property or in reputation." Donnelly, supra note 75, at 100 n.3 (emphasis added). For reports
of later cases suggesting that only false statements were actionable, see, e.g, II SELECT PLEAS
IN MANORIAL AND OTHER SEICNORIAL COURTS 82, 95 (Selden Soc. 1888). These cases were
heard in 1294 and 1278 respectively.
77 Donnelly, supra note 75, at 104.
78 T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 493 (1948).
79 See W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENcLISH LAW 207 (2d ed. 1937); Donnelly,
sura note 75, at 115.
80 See, e.g., Smyth v. Broke, reprinted in SELECT CASES IN THE STAR CHAMBER A.D.
1477-1509, at 41, 43 (Selden Society Vol. 16, 1902). Courts allowed the defendant to argue
over the truth or falsity of the statements, strongly suggesting that a defendant in an action
for defamation before the Star Chamber could plead truth as a defense.
81 See, e.g., 1 PICKERING'S STATUTES 1225-1340, at 97-98, 3 Edws. ch. 34 (D. Pickering
ed. 1762):
[lit is commanded, That from henceforth none be so hardy to tell or publish
any false News or Tales, whereby Discord, or Occasion of Discord or Slander
may grow between the King and his People, or the great Men of the Realm;
(2) and he that doth so, shall be taken and kept in Prison, until he hath
brought him into the Court, which was the first Author of the Tale.
These statutes were the predecessors of the seditious libel concept so important in American
constitutional history.
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were couched in terms of prohibitions against "false news, lyes, or other
'82
such false things.
The Star Chamber initially tried violations of Scandalum
Magnatum, but gradually extended its jurisdiction to include criminal
charges against nonpolitical defamers as well.83 This extension of juris-

diction apparently occurred because the Chamber wanted to provide a
way to avenge insults other than by the duels that had become so common during the reigns of Elizabeth I and James 1.84
In 1606, the Star Chamber, in pursuit of its dual objectives of preserving the public peace and of ensuring political stability in the face of
the increasing potency of the printing press, enunciated the novel rule
that "[ilt is not material, whether the libel be true or false."'85 The Star
Chamber purported to rely for its new approach on Roman law, but,
unlike the Roman courts, it applied the doctrine to all defamation cases
before it, political or otherwise, and whether or not by an anonymous
86
author.
When Parliament terminated the Star Chamber in 1641 and transferred its jurisdiction over criminal defamation to the King's Bench, not
surprisingly some initial confusion arose over the applicability of the defense of truth.8 7 The same court would now hear civil actions for damages, as well as criminal cases for seditious libel and libels likely to
disturb the public peace. In which of these classes of cases was truth to
be a defense, and in which not? Commentators of the era disagreed. 88
82
83

2 PICKERING'S STATUTES 1341-1411, at 222, 2 Rich. 2, c.s. (D. Pickering ed. 1762).
See Donnelly, supra note 75, at 116; Veeder, supra note 75, at 554-55. In addition to

imposing criminal penalties for defamation, the Star Chamber occasionally awarded damages
to the injured party. Id; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 78, at 461.
84 See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 79, at 210; Veeder, supra note 74, at 555.
85
De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (K.B. 1605).
86
In Roman law, anonymous charges against public officials were called libelli famosi.
See supra note 74.

William Hudson offered the following explanation for why truth should not be a defense
in criminal prosecutions for nonpolitical defamation:
[Flor libelling against a common strumpet is as great an offense as against an
honest woman, and perhaps more dangerous to the breach of the peace: for
as the woman said she would never grieve to have been told of her red nose if
she had not one indeed ....
W. HUDSON, A TREATISE OF THE COURT OF THE STAR CHAMBER, repdntedin 2 COLLECTANEA JURIDICA 102-03 (1792). Hudson probably wrote this work early in the reign of Charles
I. Veeder, sup-a note 74, at 563 n.2. Further support for this date comes from W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 79, at 164, which notes that Hudson was called to the bar in 1605 and
died in 1635.
87

See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 78, at 467.

88 Hudson, who was the first to distinguish between libel and slander actions based on
the form of the communication (written or spoken) rather than on the court that tried them
(libel in the Star Chamber and slander elsewhere), wrote that truth was always a defense to
charges of criminal or civil slander, but never to libel. W. HUDSON, sup-a note 86, at 104.
Bacon adopted Hudson's view, but added with regard to libel that the "only favour truth
affords in such a case is, that it may be shewn in mitigation of damages in an action. . . ." 5
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In light of this history, it is difficult to maintain unequivocally that
the framers of the first amendment presumed a body of common law in
which true speech was absolutely immune from civil liability. To the
extent that the drafters had any explicit concern with the role of truth in
defamation, they would undoubtedly have been far more consciously
concerned with the criminal law regulating seditious-that is, political-libel.89 During the years preceding the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, and again when the Congress adopted the Alien and Sedition
Acts in the early federal period, 9° criminal defamation was a far more
prominent issue than civil defamation. 9 1 Public debate centered on
whether truth was required as a defense in criminal actions, not on its
92
propriety in civil defamation cases.

Nonetheless, one can fairly infer from what is known of the law of
civil defamation around the time of the framing of the first amendment,
that its drafters assumed accurate speech to be immune from civil liability.93 The research of historians suggests that American decisions prior
to the drafting of the Bill of Rights supported the view of those commentators who argued that truth was an absolute defense. 94 Certainly,
BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT 203 (7th ed. C. Dodd & H. Gwyllim eds. 1852). Blackstone believed
that truth was a complete defense to all civil actions, whether for libel or slander:
But in the remedy by action on the case, which is to repair the par, in damages for the injury done him, the defendant [in a libel action] may, as for
words spoken, justify the truth of the facts, and show that the plaintiff has
received no injury at all.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES bk. III, at *126 (emphasis in original). Dicta in the case
reports support Blackstone's view. See, e.g., Lake v. Hatton, 80 Eng. Rep. 398 (Hob. 252) (c.
1645); Anonymous, 11 Mod. 99, 88 Eng. Rep. 921 (1706). See generall 1 T. STARKIE, SUpra
note 74, at 229-37.
89 For a discussion of the importance of criminal libel, especially seditious or political
libel, at the time of the drafting of the Bill of Rights, see generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 16-29 (1941); L. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960); Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free
Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 295 (1958).
90 Ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)
(current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1976)).
91 According to one commentator, criminal libel attracted so much attention because
"the criminal penalty became almost exclusively an instrument by which the government was
enabled to stifle criticism." Kelly, supra note 89, at 303. For a discussion of Andrew Hamilton's defense of John Peter Zenger, who faced seditious libel charges in 1735, and its effects,
see L. LEVY, supra note 89, at 132-33, 202-03.
92 The debates surrounding the passage in 1792 of Fox's Libel Act, 32 Geo. 3, ch. 60
(1792), illustrate the concern with criminal rather than civil libel. The author of the act
argued for a qualified defense of truth in cases of criminal libel and called the question one
"much canvassed in the world." 29 PARL. HIST. ENG. 574-75 (1791).
93 In pre-revolutionary Massachusetts, for example, truth was a defense in all civil and
criminal libel cases. See W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 39, 40 &
nn.48-49, 59, 93-95 (1975).
94 See id (citing Whitney v. Herbert, Worchester Ct. of Common Pleas (May 1765);
Green v. Stimpson, Middlesex Ct. of Common Pleas (Dec. 1760); Rex v. Flagg, Worcester Ct.
of General Sessions (Aug. 1767); Rex v. Brittan, Bristol Ct. of General Sessions Files (May
1768)).
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by the close of the eighteenth century, reported civil defamation cases in
95
England assumed, almost without discussion, a defense of truth. Similarly, nineteenth-century American case law took the unanimous position that truth always had been a complete defense in civil
defamation. 96
The historical evidence suggests that the framers of the first amendment would have viewed restraints imposed by tort law on accurate
speech-to the extent that they considered the matter at all-as inappropriate, and that the embarrassment that might result from true revelations was not considered a legal or compensable wrong. Thus, our
modern law, which assesses civil damages for true but embarrassing
speech, cannot be justified on the ground that it was an acceptable basis
for restriction of the press at the time of the adoption of the first
amendment.

B.

97

The Supreme Court's Protection of Truthful Speech in Modern
Case Law
1. The Fault Standardin Defamation Cases Requires a Defense of Truth

Supreme Court decisions over the course of the twentieth century
suggest that the Court shares the historical understanding that the first
amendment protects truthful speech in all but the most extreme situations.9 8 As recently as 1979, Chief Justice Burger, after reviewing a wide
95 See, e.g., Holmes v. Catesby, 1 Taunt 543, 127 Eng. Rep. 944 (1809); Edwards v. Bell,
1 Bing. 403, 130 Eng. Rep. 162 (1824); Weaver v. Lloyd, 2 B. & C. 678, 107 Eng. Rep. 535
(1824); see'also 1 T. STARKIE, supra note 74, at 229-37.
96 Commonwealth v. Snelling, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 337 (1834), was one of the earliest
cases following the adoption of the Bill of Rights to discuss the issue of truth as a defense in
civil cases. Chief Justice Shaw wrote:
In civil actions, and against a party coming into a court ofjustice on a claim
for damages, it had long been held as a rule of the common law, that the truth
of the facts imputed constituting the slanderous or libellous charge, might be
pleaded by way ofjustification, and if proved, constituted a good bar to the
action. In such case, of course, the motive and purpose were immaterial and
could not be the subject of inquiry. The rule proceeded upon the principle,
that whatever was the motive, if the charge against the individual suing was
true, if he was in fact guilty of the crime or disgraceful conduct imputed to
him, he had sustained no damage, for which he could claim redress in a court
of justice.
Id at 341; see also Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 111. 405, 415-17, 123 N.E. 587,
591-92 (1919) (common law rule that truth is defense to libel changed by state constitution);
Sullings v. Shakespeare, 46 Mich. 408, 411, 9 N.W. 451 (1881) (truth a defense to libel);
Neilson v. Jensen, 56 Neb. 430, 433-34, 76 N.W. 866, 867 (1898) (common law rule that truth
a defense to civil libel changed by state constitution); Hogan v. Wilmoth, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.)
38,40 (1860); Moseley v. Moss, 47 Va. 6 Gratt.) 534, 538-39 (1850) (truth a complete defense
to written and oral defamation).
97 See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text.
98 For a discussion of the history of truth as a defense to defamation, see supra notes 6596 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has recognized that some accurate communications could be so damaging to national or individual interests that a limited use of re-
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range of the Court's first amendment opinions, concluded that "state
action to punish the publication of truthful information can seldom satisfy constitutional standards." 99
The most illuminating line of Supreme Court cases on the question
of when, if ever, states may provide damage awards for truthful but
embarrassing communications are the libel and false-light privacy cases
beginning in the 1960s. Both lines of cases deal with tort law and involve interests roughly comparable to those at stake in the private-facts
cases. In addition, these opinions are the first in which the Court deals
directly with the theoretical implication of truth and falsity for the scope
of constitutional protection of speech.
The Court's decisions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 100 and its
progeny leave little doubt that truth should be considered a constitutionally mandated defense,1 0' at least in the context of common law tort
actions for harmful speech. The Court has declared the Sullivan line of
cases to rest upon the premise that false speech can be regulated because
it has no constitutional value. 10 2 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 103 the
Court confirmed that proposition:
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on
public issues.

.

.

. They belong to that category of utterances which

"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
straints on speech might be appropriate. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 556-62 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Commentators, however, have identified certain
kinds of accurate information that are more freely regulated, including obscene depictions of
sexual intercourse, the publication of private letters, or the misappropriation of a performance or another commercially valuable personal attribute. See, e.g., Lusky, Invasion ofPivacy:
A Clarifwationof Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 698 (1972); Note, Tortious Invasion ofPAivacy.
Minnesota as a Model, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163, 215-16 (1978).
99 Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979).
100 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The plaintiff in Sullivan was a Commissioner of the City of
Montgomery, Ala., who complained that inaccuracies contained in an advertisement published by the New York Times defamed him, although nowhere in the advertisement was his
name used.
101
Professor Franklin argues that the Constitution requires a truth defense. See Franklin,
The Originsand Constitutionalityo(Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV.
789 (1963); Franklin, A ConstitutionalProblem in trvay Protection: LegalInhibitions on Reportingof
Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107 (1963). Professor Nimmer disagrees. See Nimmer, The Right to
Speakfom Times to Time: First Amendment Theo. Applied to Libel and Misappliedto Privaqy, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968) (interpreting Sullivan as establishing a balancing test). Franklin
and Nimmer wrote early in the Court's exposition of its views on libel and privacy; subsequent cases support the Franklin view. See infra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
102
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (1964). Professor Emerson has
criticized on two grounds the Court's position that false or inaccurate speech is valueless.
First, he claims that inaccurate statements often force others to "defend, justify and rethink
their positions" T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 530-31 (1970).
Second, he protests that by denying a class of speech first amendment protection on the merits, the Court applies an impermissible normative test. Id
103

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. '' t o4

Because the Court finds false speech constitutionally valueless because it
does not contribute to public debate or a search for truth, it follows

logically that its opposite-accurate speech-must deserve substantial
protection. The Court, therefore, would presumably regard state laws
restricting free exchange of accurate speech with skepticism, if not outright disapproval.
Indeed, the Court has buttressed this inference by the justification
it has used for narrowing the scope of common law libel' 0 5 and falselight:106 tort liability. The Court has made clear that, in order for the
first amendment to promote widespread circulation of ideas and truthful information, it must provide some "breathing space" for accurate
speech by extending protection for some falsehoods. 0 7 A margin for
cost-free error is needed, the Court claims, to avoid the evils of self-censorship of accurate information by the press and by individual speakers.' 0 8 Unless some false speech is protected,
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in
fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of
the expense of having to do so. They [would] tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the lawful zone." . . The rule thus
dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.' 0 9

The Court has therefore developed a series of fault standards to
immunize a broad range of inaccurate communications from liability
under tort law. The Court has concluded that, whether commenting
unfavorably upon the actions of government and public figures110 or
104 Id at 340 (citations omitted); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
105 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
(1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Ocala Star-Banner Co.
v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106 See supra note 21.
107 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
108 376 U.S. at 278-79.
109 Id at 279 (citations omitted).
110 Curtis Pu/lishing Co. v.Butts and Associated Press v. Waker were decided in a single
opinion. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Butts involved a claim of libel by a football coach at a public
university, while Walker concerned a libel action by a retired military officer. In Butts and
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reporting on the lives of private citizens swept up in matters of public
interest,"' speakers should not be deterred from free discussion simply
because they could not prospectively guarantee the accuracy of everything they might say. Thus, the Court has imposed on false-light plaintiffs and defamed public figures or officials the burden of showing that
the defendants knowingly lied or acted recklessly with regard to the
truth or falsity of their statements.
The Court has given greater protection to private plaintiffs in defamation cases by removing the onerous requirement of demonstrating
knowing or reckless falsehood, but it does require a private plaintiff to
submit at least some proof of the defendant's fault. A majority of the
Justices has nevertheless claimed that the Court has left open the question of whether the Constitution requires a defense of truth in libel suits
brought by private, rather than public, persons. An examination of the
112
Court's private defamation cases suggests otherwise.
In his Cox concurrence,' 3 Justice Powell argues that Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 14 can be explained only by assuming that truth is a
mandatory defense to both public and private libel actions.'1 5 In Gertz,
an attorney whom the Court found to be a private figure, brought a
defamation action. The Court in Gertz declared that the private-person
defamation cases required a showing of fault by the defendant in publishing the challenged information. 116 Justice Powell noted "that if the
statements are true, the standard contemplated by Gertz cannot be
satisfied."' 17
Justice Powell's conclusion is supported by careful reading of Gertz.
The Gertz Court held that false speech falls outside the ambit of protection of the first amendment. 118 Moreover, throughout the opinion, the
Gertz majority repeated that liability in defamation actions entails factual misstatements.' 19 The Court further voiced concern that a need "to
guarantee the accuracy of. . . factual assertions may lead to intolerable
Walker, a plurality of the Court found that protection for true speech alone would provide too
narrow a shield for free discussion of public issues. Id at 152 (opinion of Harlan, J.).
111 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Hill involved an ordinary family that had
been thrust into the public eye by becoming victims of a crime. The Court in Hill found that
"[s]anctions against either innocent or negligent misstatement would present a grave hazard
of discouraging the press from exercising the constitutional guarantees." Id at 389.
112 See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 323 (1975); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 72 n.8 (1964).
113 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cox.

114

418 U.S. 323 (1974).

115 See 420 U.S. at 497 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
116 See 418 U.S. at 346-49.
117 420 U.S. at 499.
118 "IT]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional
lie nor the careless error riaterially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open' debate on public issues." 418 U.S. at 340.
119 See id at 338, 340, 341, 344, 346.
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self-censorship." 1 20 Ultimately, the majority held that states should
have greater latitude in protecting the reputation of private individuals
than the strict "knowing-or-reckless" standard of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan allowed. The Court concluded, however, that even private
plaintiffs should not be able to recover for defamation without both
proof of fault 12 1 and a showing that the subject matter of the alleged
defamation was such that a reasonable publisher would recognize it as
a "substantial danger to reputation."' 2 2 The Court ruled that a strict
1 23
liability libel standard is unconstitutional.
By rejecting the knowing-or-reckless standard of Sullivan, yet still
resting liability on fault, Gertz in effect equates fault with negligence.
To fit an accurate statement within that standard, the plaintiff would
have to show that the true but discreditable revelation had somehow
been negligently made.' 24 The notion of "negligent truth" is difficult to
grasp. Arguably, sufficient "fault" for constitutional purposes could be
said to occur if the publisher of a true but libelous report negligently
overlooks the likelihood that the accurate statement will harm the plaintiff's community standing. 125 Such an approach, however, poses serious
problems. It is difficult to imagine how, in all but the most unusual
cases, 126 the Court could articulate a standard that would differentiate
negligent from nonnegligent publication of the truth in any case in
120
121
122
123
124

Id at 340.
See id at 347.

Id at 348 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
See id at 347 n.10.
The Supreme Court seems to have decided that for libel to be actionable, the defendant must either have been negligent or aware that the statement was false. A defendant who
honestly believes a statement to be true is not liable to the plaintiff, even if he made it with an
intent to do harm. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
125 The court in Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974), held that
truth was insufficient as a defense under the federal constitutional standard set out in Gertz.
In Taylor, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a television station that aired a short sequence
of the plaintiff being arrested and emerging nude from his house could be held liable for
invasion of privacy because it either knew that the plaintiff would be embarrassed and humiliated by the film, or at least acted "with reckless disregard as to whether that disclosure
[would] result in such embarrassment or humiliation." Id at 205-06, 525 P.2d at 988. Compare Note, First Amendment Limitations on Public DisclosureActions, 45 U. CHi. L. REV.180, 19496 (1977) (criticizing the Taylor holding) with Note, Tortious Invasion of Pivagy: Minnesota as a
Model, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163, 199-205 (1978) (recommending a negligence standard
for private-facts cases). See also Swan, Publicity Invasions of Privaov: Constitutionaland Doctrinal
Dijftultieswith a Developing Tort, 58 OR. L. REv. 483 (1980) (advocating a knowing-or-reckless

disregard standard).
126 The publication of an embarrassing truth could be found nonnegligent when harm
results because of additional facts, extrinsic to the information reported, and not known to the
defendant. For instance, a photograph of a couple holding hands could be damaging if one
or both were married to other people, but its publication would not be negligent if the defendant could not have known that fact. Although such cases undoubtedly occur, the case
reports suggest that they occur rarely, and, thus, such a standard would exempt only the
occasional defendant from liability. The vast majority of privacy defendants would not be
helped.
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which a plaintiff could prove he or she was in fact injured by the statement. Thus, whenever the publication could be found on its face or in
reality to diminish reputation or to cause embarrassment, a court would
tend to find liability. If strict liability for defamatory statements is unconstitutional, this functional strict liability for true statements is a fortion unconstitutional.
The concept of "negligent truth" creates an internal inconsistency
with the premise of Gertz. Although the majority in Gertz was unwilling
to require states to use the Sullivan standard for private-person libel actions, it was also unwilling to free the states to use any standard that
they chose. Regardless of how strong the equities were on behalf of private persons, liability for nonnegligent falsehoods was too restrictive of
free speech rights. 127 Thus, the Court clearly contemplated that at least
some people would suffer reputational injuries as a result of false information and have no redress in the courts.
To extract from Gertz, therefore, a standard that would both impose liability for accurate speech and do so in virtually any case where
reputational and emotional injury could be predicted, would be to
broaden rather than narrow the exposure of the media and individuals
to liability. Such a reading would contradict the Court's obvious intent
in Gertz. It would also fly in the face of the reasonably consistent common law history of truth as a full defense to civil damage claims for
libel. 128
2.

The Court's Disapprovalof Subjective Standards in Restricting Speech

In deciding Gertz, the Court did not need to address one particular
relevant wrinkle in the libel law of a handful of jurisdictions. Some
states, by statute or constitution, permit libel recovery for true but inju1 29
rious statements if they are published with an improper motive.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
128 See supra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
129 In his treatise on libel, Sack lists the states that recognize truth as a defense in civil
libel "only if the communication is published with good motives and for justifiable ends." R.
SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 131 (1980).

These states include Dela-

ware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3919 (1974) (truth is a defense if published with no "malicious or mischievious motives"); Florida, FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 4; Kansas, KAN. CONST. BILL

OF RIGHTS § 11; Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 92 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974);
Nebraska, NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5; Nevada, NEv. CONST. art. I, § 9; New Hampshire, Chagnon v. Union Leader Corp., 103 N.H. 426, 174 A.2d 825, cert. denied, 369 U.S. 830 (1961);
North Dakota, N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4; Rhode Island, R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (truth a defense "unless published from malicious motives'); South Dakota, S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5;
West Virginia, W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 8; Wyoming, Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 20. See R. SACK,

supra, at 131 n.10. Some-doubt exists as to the state of the law in Maine. Compare ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 152 (1964) (truth a defense to libel unless published with a malicious
intent) with Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 834-35 (Me. 1973) (truth always a defense to
slander). The Illinois Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a clause in the Illinois constitution that qualifies the truth defense. See infla note 145; Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill.
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These provisions effectively proclaim that an intent to do harm can
overcome the privilege for true statements. Only once, in Garrisonv. Louisiana, 130 a criminal defamation action, did the Court examine such a
limitation. In Garrison, the Supreme Court reversed a criminal libel conviction against the District Attorney of Orleans Parish, Louisiana. The
Court rejected an inquiry into the motives of the libeler, except to the
extent that such inquiry was necessary to decide whether the statement
at issue was intentionally or recklessly false. Although the Court expressly declined to rule that motive is never a permissible inquiry under
the first amendment,13 1 it suggested that motive is irrelevant whenever
the injurious speech involves matters of public interest:
Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must
run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred;
even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.
Under a rule like the Louisiana rule, permitting a finding of malice
based on an intent merely to inflict harm, rather than an intent to
inflict harm through falsehood, "it becomes a hazardous matter to
speak out against a popular politician, with
the result that the dishon132
est and incompetent will be shielded."
The Court's comments on inquiries into the legitimacy of a speaker's
motives, although pronounced in the context of a seditious libel prosecution, should apply equally to civil actions.133 Indeed, the sentiments expressed in Garrison seem consistent with the general tenor of the
Supreme Court's decisions in first amendment cases over the past half
century, and make it unlikely that the Court will abandon the requirement that defamation be false solely because of the speaker's subjective
intent.
2d 286, 290, 253 N.E.2d 408, 410 (1969). The states that treat truth as a partial rather than a
complete defense were influenced by a nineteenth-century American case and its aftermath.
In 1803, the state of New York prosecuted Harry Croswell for seditious libel. People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337 (N.Y. 1804). At the time, New York followed the English rule that
truthful speech was punishable as a crime if it cast government or its officials in a bad light.
See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. Alexander Hamilton, who represented Croswell, argued-in lawyerly fashion-for a modification rather than an outright rejection of
that well-entrenched doctrine. He suggested that true speech should be protected as long as it
was spoken "with good motives, for justifiable ends." Id at 352. The New York court rejected Hamilton's argument, but the legislature adopted it and his language in an 1805 statute. Levy, supra note 89, at 299. Other states then picked up the New York formulation and
applied it in both their criminal and civil law. See also infra note 214.
130 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
131
132

See id at 72-73 & 73 n.9.
Id at 73 (quoting Noel, Defamation ofPAblic Offters and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. RV.

875, 893 (1949)).
133 The Court in Garrison stated: "Where criticism of public officials is concerned, we see
no merit in the argument that criminal libel statutes serve interests distinct from those secured by civil libel laws, and therefore should not be subject to the same limitations." Id at
67.
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Over time and in a wide range of situations, the Court has shown
increasing reluctance to permit restrictions on speech based on the subjective attitudes, beliefs, hopes, and inclinations of the speaker.134 The
cardinal rule of first amendment jurisprudence is that "no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion." 135 Presumably, the first amendment would also bar the state from requiring orthodoxy in matters of
emotion.
Indeed, the Court has exhibited concern that attitudes and beliefs
should not be penalized. During and immediately following World War
I, the Court permitted repression of speech simply because individuals
believed in "antisocial" ideas and expressed those beliefs publicly in
words. 136 By 1969, however, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio137 had
moved to the opposite pole.1 38 The Court held that a state could no
longer justify the suppression of speech merely because the speaker desired to achieve mean-spirited and vicious ends. The state must instead
make the nearly impossible showing that an imminent likelihood exists
139
that the speech will incite lawless action.
Cohen v. California 140 provides another example of the Court's reluctance to impose penalties because of the subjective thought processes of
the speaker. The majority in Cohen rejected the use of societal norms to
determine whether speech is too rude or debasing of decent social intercourse to be protected. 141 More importantly, the Court expressly stated
that the first amendment protects not merely words themselves but the
emotional matrix that underlies them and is so vital to the process of
communication. 142
134 See generaly Emerson, Towarda General Thoy ofthe FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
919-20 (1963) (discussing protection of the "freedom of belief" under the first amendment).
135 West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
136 Advocates of criminal activity and violators of the Espionage Act, ch. 30, tit. 1, 40

Stat. 217, 217-19 (1917) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) were targeted
for punishment for their unpopular speech. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927) (communist convicted for organizing group that advocated criminal activity to accomplish industrial change); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (socialist convicted for
advocating criminal anarchy); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (defendants
convicted under Espionage Act for inciting strike of workers at ammunition factory); Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (defendant convicted for violating Espionage Act by
sending circulars tending to obstruct draft).
137 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
138 See generall, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 728-40
(1978) (discussing the Court's move from a bad-tendency test to a strict and narrow "clear
and present danger" standard).
139

See 395 U.S. at 447.

140
141

403 U.S. 15 (1971).
See id at 24-25.
[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force.
We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive

142
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Thus, a rule of law requiring a court or a jury to pass on the acceptability of a speaker's emotions or the worthiness of his purposes would
contravene the principle underlying Barnette, Brandenburg, and Cohen.
The Court has acknowledged that the purpose of the first amendment is
to encourage free trade in the marketplace of ideas.1 43 A statement is
neither more nor less provocative, neither more nor less significant, simply because the person who articulates it speaks in anger or in calm.
Hence emotions or motives standing alone should not subject otherwise
protectible speech to legal restrictions. Moreover, if the first amendment also protects individual autonomy, 144 such a value is scarcely
served by allowing the courts to favor certain emotional states or to require "socially acceptable" motives as predicates for the exercise of the
fundamental right to speak. It thus seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court, even in cases dealing with libels against private persons, would
accept any dilution of the defense of truth, including one premised on
an examination of the speaker's thoughts, feelings and beliefs. 145
The Supreme Court has suggested that libel law protects not
merely a property interest in reputation, but a "certain privacy around
[the plaintiff's] personality from unwarranted intrusion."1 46 If the
Court recognizes truth as a full defense to libel, one may reasonably
predict that it will continue to protect truthful speech that compromises
only privacy interests. Because of the Court's lack of guidance in this
area, however, it is necessary to examine the private-facts tort to see
function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.
Id at 26.
143 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is
the theory of our Constitution.
The Court has endorsed this notion of a free exchange and competition of ideas in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269-70 (1964), and in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
144 See Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrineand the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422, 42426 (1980); Emerson, supra note 134, at 879-81; cf Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (interference with "individual's scruples or conscience" violates
right to privacy).
145 The Illinois Supreme Court has already invalidated art. II, sec. 4 of the Illinois Constitution, which makes truth a defense to libel only if spoken with "good motives and for
justifiable ends," as violating the first amendment of the federal constitution, at least as applied to persons involved in public issues. See Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253
N.E.2d 408 (1969); f Koren v. Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 22 Md. App. 576, 581, 325
A.2d 140, 143 (1974) (interpreting Supreme Court cases as requiring truth to be an absolute
defense in reporting newsworthy events).
146 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971).
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whether considerations exist that justify either broad or narrow liability
as an exception to the general rule that truth is immune from
punishment.
III
COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE PRIVATE-FACTS TORT

In his Cox concurrence, Justice Powell distinguished between the
interests underlying defamation and those underlying private-facts actions: "causes of action grounded in a State's desire to protect privacy
generally implicate interests that are distinct from those protected by
defamation."'1 47 In so doing, he left open the possibility that those undefined privacy interests might be so substantial as to justify liability for
true speech despite the Gertz rule. Justice Powell thus raises a critical
question about the precise nature and weight of the asserted state interest in permitting a cause of action for truthful but embarrassing disclosures of private facts.
The Court in Smith v. Dai' Mail Publishing Co. 148 made it very clear
that state action infringing on the fundamental rights of speech and the
press must pass strict judicial scrutiny. The Court reviewed a West Virginia statute making it a criminal offense to publish the name of someone charged as a juvenile offender and concluded-at least as to matters
of "public significance," "[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information. . . then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the
149
highest order."
At present, few clues exist to determine what constitutes a "state
interest of the highest order" in the privacy-tort area. The Court did
not need to weigh interests in its libel decisions because it found that
deliberate falsehoods were totally outside the purview of the first
amendment, and that negligent falsehoods do not contribute anything
important to the free marketplace of ideas.' 50 Since this speech was not
protected, the Court did not need to decide if the interest in regulating
it was a "state interest of the highest order." But even if the weight of
the states' interest in providing redress for libel were an issue, the ancient common law history of protecting individuals from defamation
provided the Court with a basis for finding the states' purpose sufficiently substantial. 15 1 History provides no equivalent support for the
Cox, 420 U.S. at 500.
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
149 Id at 103.
150 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
151 In Gert, one can infer a historical basis from the Court's assumption without discussion that the historical interest in protecting the citizenry against defamation is sufficient to
permit some content-based restrictions on speech. See 418 U.S. at 341. The majority's approving reference to a statement by Justice Marshall that "[s]tates should be 'essentially free
147

148
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Warren-Brandeis notion of a protection for the right to privacy. 5 2 That
interest, therefore, will have to swing alone on the scales of justice without the heavy thumb of a thousand years of Anglo-American legal development to lend it bulk.
A. The Substantiality of the Interests Protected By the Privacy Tort
Smith, which was a type of privacy case, suggests that in the ultimate weighing, the private-facts interest may well be insufficient. The
state argued that it had a compelling concern in protecting the anonymity of a child charged with a crime and should therefore be permitted to
penalize the accurate publication of the juvenile offender's identity.1 53
By prohibiting publication of the offender's name, the state sought to
encourage rehabilitation and to minimize the adverse social and economic consequences later in life resulting from the child's early brush
with the law.154 The Court agreed that the state's concerns were important, but held that they did not approach the level of significance that
would justify a limit on the first amendment rights to publish accurate
information.155
How, then, could a state convince the Court that the interest protected by the private-facts tort outweighs the constitutional interest in
free speech? Presumably, it would need first to be able to articulate the
reasons that justify creation of a legal remedy for unwanted revelations
about the self, and that might be difficult to do.
The commentators are in considerable disagreement over how to
describe the purposes of this tort. Dean Prosser, for example, suggested
that the tort protects two interests: an interest in freedom from emoto continue the evolution of the common law of defamation and to articulate whatever fault
standard best suits the States' need[s]," id at 339 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 86 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)), also suggests that the long history of defamation law affected the Court. The most thorough exposition of the historical argument is, of
course, that set out by Justice White in his discussion of the appropriate standard to apply in
libel cases involving private plaintiffs. Justice White quotes extensively from earlier cases and
commentators to support the view that the first amendment was intended to coexist with
defamation recovery for private parties in tort law. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 380-88; see a/so
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-58 (1952) (giving great weight to the historical
acceptance of criminal libel laws in upholding an Illinois statute); cf.Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 676-78 (1979) (relying on history in interpreting first amendment).
152 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
153
"The sole interest advanced by the State to justify its criminal statute is to protect the
anonymity of the juvenile offender." 443 U.S. at 104.
154
155

See id

See id at 104-05. In Smith, the defendant faced criminal penalties for publishing the
material. See id at 98-99. Conceivably the strictest standard for substantiality would be imposed before a state could use criminal law to penalize speech. The libel cases, however,
suggest that civil penalties are as offensive under the Constitution as are criminal penalties.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964). Even if the State's
burden were less onerous when it limits speech by recognizing tort remedies, no reason exists
to believe that the difference in standards would be extreme.
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tional distress, and an interest in preventing reputational injury. 5
Other commentators contend that the tort protects only against emotional harm, and ignore or deny the relevance of reputational injury to
these privacy cases. 157 Bloustein rejects both the reputational and emotional distress arguments, and responds that the tort, in preserving some
"right to be let alone," really protects "individual dignity and integrity," and prevents the loss of "individual freedom and
independence." 158
The factual situations which have generated law suits in this area of
tort law give but small aid in choosing among these theories. Some cases
clearly involve both reputational harm and the probable infliction of
substantial amounts of mental distress; plaintiffs in those suits seek to
recover to some extent for the damage to their standing in their communities. 159 But other cases may involve only one, or none, of these
elements.
In Virgil v. Time, Inc., 160 for example, the plaintiff-a daring body
surfer whose escapades included eating spiders and extinguishing lit cigarettes in his mouth-more or less flaunted his odd behavior and used it
to attract attention and to achieve prominence among his peers in the
Newport Beach, California, area. 16 1 Given the public nature of Virgil's
behavior, it is difficult to imagine how an accurate written description of
his antics could cause reputational harm in any classic sense. For the
same reason, the published account seems unlikely to have caused him
more than minimal emotional injury.
156 See Prosser, supra note 8, at 398 ("The interest protected is that of reputation, with the
same overtones of mental distress that are present in libel and slander.").
157
Cf Nimmer, supra note 101, at 958 (tort protects emotional harm, not reputational
injury); Pound, Interests of Personality (pt. 1), 28 HARv. L. REV. 343, 363 (1915) (interpreting
private-facts tort as protecting against emotional harm); Warren & Brandeis,supra note 1, at
196 (mentioning only emotional harm); Comment, Privaey, Defamation, and the First Amendment:
The Implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 926, 926 (1967) (tort protects emotional harm, not reputational injury).
158 Bloustein, Thoaf, as an Aspect ofHunanDignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 962, 970-71 (1964).
159 Such a case is Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931), which involved a
revelation that a "respectable" married woman formerly had been a prostitute. Similarly, the
privacy action brought by Oliver Sipple, whose heroic actions prevented the assassination of
President Gerald Ford, sought remedy for the reputational injury that Sipple suffered by the
revelation that he was a homosexual. See Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 82
Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978). Under the prevailing social mores, both of these
exposures were of a sort that could cause these plaintiffs both acute mental anguish and
concrete losses of jobs, friends, and family relationships.
160 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). The Ninth Circuit
vacated the trial court's order denying summary judgment to defendants, and remanded.
The trial court then granted summary judgment to Time, Inc., on the ground that the revelations in question were protected by the newsworthiness privilege. Virgil v. Sports Illustrated,
424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976); see also infia notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
161
See 527 F.2d at 1124-25, 1124 n.1.
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The famous case of Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 162 whose plaintiff is
viewed by some as one of the most sympathetic in the annals of privacy
law,' 63 certainly cannot be explained in terms of reputational injury. In
Sidis, a former child prodigy's adult life as a rather reclusive, eccentric,
and undistinguished office clerk was described in a New Yorker magazine
profile.' 6 4 The story revealed nothing to Sidis's discredit, and its effect
was more likely to create sympathy for him than to reduce his stature
among his associates and friends. On the other hand, Sidis, a highly
vulnerable individual, genuinely seems to have been emotionally disturbed by the frank portrait of his life.
Finally, consider the plaintiff in Cason v. Baskin. 165 After a lengthy
legal battle, 66 she won nominal damages for being portrayed in a book
by Majorie Rawlings in a way that was frankly admiring and, to an
67
outside observer, decidedly flattering.
These plaintiffs do not seem to share any single common injury. It
would be difficult to tell with any assurance whether any or all of them
lost their dignity or integrity through these publications. Reputational
injury is probable in some cases and at best questionable in others; in
some instances it is even hard to believe that the plaintiffs' feelings were
hurt. What these plaintiffs do seem to have in common is a dislike of
being talked about by the general public, and a willingness to use the
courts to complain about it-ironically, even when the probable result is
further publicity for the supposedly "private" facts at issue. I68 That a
dislike of publicity emerges as the surest common denominator of the
private-facts cases is not surprising. After all, a dislike of publicity is
exactly what impelled Warren and Brandeis to suggest the creation of
the privacy right in the first place.169 When weighed against the social
and constitutional costs of preventing such publicity, however, a legal
162 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). Although the court sympathized with the plaintiff, it
affirmed the lower court decision to dismiss on the ground that the details of Sidis's life were
newsworthy.
163 See, e.g., E. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 95 (1978); Kalven, supra
note 6, at 337; Karafiol, supra note 32.

164

Sidis was a mathematical genius who graduated from Harvard at 16, but subse-

quently suffered an emotional breakdown and retired into an undistinguished, seemingly

lonely existence. 113 F.2d at 807.
165 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947).
166 The case came before the Florida Supreme Court on two separate appeals. See id;
Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).
167 Zelma Cason was described in Ms. Rawlings's book, Cross Creek, as an irascible, occasionally profane, but brave, warm, and widely loved figure in her Florida county. The segment of the book describing Ms. Cason is reprinted at 155 Fla. 198, 202-05, 20 So. 2d 243,

245-46 (1944).
168 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 39, at 348; Kalven, supra note 6, at 338-39. Kalven even
suggests that such actions will rarely be brought by any except those with "shabby, unseemly
grievances and an interest in exploitation." Id at 338.
169 See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
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action to support such a distaste is not highly compelling.1 70 Even if one
were to assume that each case involved at least emotional injury and
damage to dignity and that many also involve reputational harm, it remains unclear whether preventing such harm is a social interest of sufficient magnitude to give the states a right to limit free speech.
1. The Problems Associated with CompensatingEmotional Harm
Regardless of the source of the injury, a tort recovery based solely
or largely on claimed psychological harm (within which I would include
emotional distress and possibly injuries to dignity) hardly rests on firm
legal ground. Traditionally, courts were extremely reluctant to compensate plaintiffs for emotional harms except as an adjunct to awards of
damages for other injuries that the courts deemed more concrete and
easier to value.' 7 1 Roscoe Pound once explained:
There are obvious difficulties of proof in such cases, so that false testimony as to mental suffering may be adduced easily and is very hard
to detect. Hence this individual interest has to be balanced carefully
with a social interest against the use of the law to further
imposture.172
Today, sixty-five years after Pound wrote those words, the award of
damages exclusively for emotional harm remains controversial in tort
law. Many states now follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
allow for recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
caused by a defendant's outrageous behavior. 173 Nonetheless, sufficient
problems of proof and valuation remain that lead courts and commentators alike to tread cautiously in further extending the right to recovery
174
for emotional harms.
Such caution seems especially appropriate when speech is the sole
170
In using these examples, and expressing a doubt about the significance of the shared
interest that explains them, I do not mean to suggest that true disclosures are always harmless, or that none of these plaintiffs were injured. I am simply illustrating that the tort law
they invoke does not rest on a well-defined and precise foundation.
171
Se Handford, IntentionalInfiction ofMental Distress: Analysis of the Growth of a Tort, 8
ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1980); Pound, supra note 157, at 359; Theis, The IntentionalInliion
of Emotional Distress: A Needfor Limits on Liability, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 275, 275-76 (1977);
Note, Torts: An Analysis of MentalDistressas an Element of Damagesandas a Basis of an Independent
Caase of Action When Intentionally Caused, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 106, 107-08 (1980); Comment,
Negligently Inficted MentalDistress: The Casefor an Independent Tort, 59 GEo. LJ. 1237, 1238-45
(1971).
172 Pound, supra note 157, at 359-60.
173 RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
174 The Restatement (Second) of Torts continues to limit recovery for emotional distress
to those cases in which the injury is caused by outrageous, intentional behavior by the defendant or where it is an element of harm incurred by the invasion of some independent legal
interest. Id § 47 comments a, b; see also Note, Defamation,.Pivaqyand the FirstAmendment, 1976
DUKE LJ. 1016, 1039.
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source of the injury. In a libel action, Time, Inc. v. Firestone,175 the plaintiff, Mrs. Firestone, abandoned all claims for pecuniary damage to her
reputation and sued only to recover for emotional distress.176 A jury
found for the plaintiff, and the court awarded her $100,000. t 7 7 The libel
at issue was an erroneous Time magazine report that a Florida court had
granted Mr. Firestone a divorce, partly on grounds of adultery. t 78 The
case received extensive publicity--contributed to by Mrs. Firestone's
press conferencesI 79-and both sides did charge one another with adultery, a fact that was widely reported.'8 0 Thus, it is difficult to understand how a brief, if accurate, report in Tme magazine by itself could
have inflicted such extreme emotional damage. The anomalous award
prompted Justice Brennan to warn in his dissent that the allowance of
such a recovery without proof of injury to reputation "is clearly to invite
'gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury'
and jury punishment of 'unpopular opinion rather than [compensation
to] individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false
fact.' "181
Justice Brennan's concern is equally appropriate in private-fact
cases because courts do not require proof of special damages, 182 and thus
provide little objective evidence against which to test the size of a jury
award for mental distress.1 83 The risk that damages awarded for emotional distress may exceed the harm done is acceptable in some areas of
tort law because the law wants to discourage the underlying behavior.
When the alleged injury results from speech, however, the threat of un175
176
177
178

424 U.S. 448 (1976).
See id at 460.
See id at 452.
Id Not until the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the decree did it become clear that

the legal ground for the divorce was "extreme cruelty." Id at 459. The divorce court had
relied on "lack of domestication of the parties," which was not a valid basis for granting the
decree in Florida. Id at 458-59.
179 Id at 454-55 & n.3.
180 Id at 450-51; id. at 484-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Florida Supreme Court
referred to the case as a "cause c~l~bre." Id at 454.
181 Id at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (bracketed language in original) (citing Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)).
182

See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 815 (4th ed. 1971). The Restatement Second says that,

after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), it is likely that recovery for invasion of
privacy will be confined to compensation for "actual injury." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652H comment c (1977). It suggests, however, that a plaintiff's bare testimony as to
feelings of emotional distress alone could be sufficient to demonstrate "actual injury." Id
183 A recent California case indicates the potential for large mental distress verdicts in
private-facts cases. Plaintiff won $250,000 in compensatory damages (in addition to a
$525,000 punitive award), largely for psychological harm. Her actual expenditures for therapy were $800. The lawsuit was brought by plaintiff, first woman president of her college's
student body, because a columnist in the Oakland Tribune revealed that plaintiff had undergone a sex-change operation. Although the decision was reversed on appeal, the reviewing
court specifically declined to find that the damages at trial were excessive. Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune, Inc., 9 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA) 1121 (Cal. App., Jan. 18, 1983).
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controlled jury verdicts poses an entirely different problem. The Constitution seeks to encourage speech except in rare and especially egregious
forms. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the risk of large, speculative damage awards chills desirable as well as undesirable speech, and
does so as effectively as can the threat of a prison sentence or criminal
84
fine. 1
2.

A Casefor the Positive Value of Gossip

The privacy tort not only poses problems of definition and damages, but also rests upon a dubious assumption that society has a greater
interest in protecting certain details of an individual's life than in protecting the values on which our traditional constitutional preference for
unrestricted speech depends. A closer examination raises serious doubts,
however, as to whether our society in reality has ever placed so high a
value on protecting an individual's reputation, dignity or emotional security from the assaults of true disclosures.
The literature on privacy has emphasized the social and philosophical bases supporting the notion that law should protect against publication of private facts. What is "private" has been variously defined by
courts and commentators, but in the aggregate includes a wide range of
data about individuals' character, personality, and social behavior. The
privacy literature, however, has rarely acknowledged a contrary body of
evidence, casting doubt on the preeminent value of privacy and suggesting that the communication of information about such personal
matters may serve a useful and productive social function. To the extent that this expression has worth, arguments for its suppression need
serious reconsideration.
History, religious doctrines, literature, and the social sciences are
replete with examples that suggest our society is at least ambivalent
about the weight to assign to interests in personal privacy when they
compete with the value of truthfulness about the character and activities
185
of our neighbors.
Christianity, which has strongly influenced Anglo-American law,
often seemed to value public exposure of an individual's faults and
weaknesses as a way to stimulate better behavior in others and to assure
the personal salvation of the sinner.1 86 Hester Prynne becomes a powerful moral force in her New England community because, unlike her
lover, Dimmesdale, she must acknowledge her sin publicly. 18 7 The com184 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) ("The fear of damage
awards under a [tort liability law] may be markedly more inhibiting [of free speech) than the
fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.").
185 See, e.g., Shils, supra note 9, at 302-03. See generally Posner, The Right ofPrivaq, 12 GA.
L. REv. 393 (1978).
186 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
187

See N. HAWrHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1878).
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munity benefits as a result, because it can take the true measure of Hester, whereas it cannot do so of others, like Dimmesdale, who continue to
be protected by undeserved good reputations.' 8 8
In daily life, the equivocation between respecting privacy and preferring public knowledge becomes even more evident. Parents teach
their children that "tattling" is wrong, yet the children grow up in a
world in which courts, academic honor systems, and other social and
legal institutions may require them for the good of the community to
reveal what they know about the activities of their associates and
neighbors.
The reasons behind such ambivalence are easily uncovered. Most
of us have some personal traits or indiscretions that we would prefer to
remain unknown. We may also believe, as a matter of ethics, religious
training, or simple good manners, that it is wrong, unkind or vulgar to
make certain revelations about others. Yet, we at least tacitly recognize
that the cohesiveness and durability of any social organization depends
upon the ability of its members to evaluate each other accurately and to
use their observations to exert, modify, or develop social controls.' 89
Two sources support this assertion. First, social scientists in this
century have developed both an understanding of the constructive functions of gossip and a recognition of its universality in human communities. Second, history suggests that we have intuitively appreciated the
benefits of free exchange of gossip for a long while and that our understanding of its value may well have been a major force in the extraordinary reluctance of the English common law to develop legal sanctions
against truthful speech.
a. Gossipfrom a Historical Perspective. In northern Europe during
the Dark Ages and the medieval period, the privilege of social participation in the upper strata of society depended not merely on birth or other
formal indicia of status, but also upon notions of character or individual
worth.'90 Bad character alone could incapacitate a man from oath-tak188

Posner says this about undeserved reputations and the privacy tort:

[W]e have no right, by controlling the information that is known about us to
manipulate the opinions that other people hold of us. Yet this control is the
essence of what most students of the subject mean by privacy.
Posner, supra note 185, at 408.
189 Professor Chafee points out that another source of ambivalence about privacy versus
exposure is the pleasure that many people derive from receiving publicity in the media:
Times have changed since Brandeis wrote in 1890: Seeing how society dames
and damsels sell their faces for cash in connection with cosmetics, cameras,
and cars, one suspects that the right to publicity is more highly valued than
any right to privacy. . . . So I recommend that respect for privacy be left to
public opinion and the conscience of owners and editors.
Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS' 138 (1965) (emphasis omitted).
190 See J. GOEBEL, FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF CRIMI-
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ing. 19 Thus, he could not participate as either a plaintiff or a witness in
a legal proceeding and, if accused of a serious crime, could not clear
himself of the charge by his oath as might a man of unblemished reputation. 192 Similarly, in a feudal society, in which social relations and the
structure of government itself consisted of an interlocking pyramid of
promises of loyalty and service from vassal to lord, the right to hold land
necessarily depended upon the individual's reputation for

faithfulness. 193
Julius Goebel, in his study of the origins of English criminal law,
traces the legal incapacitation of an infamous person to numerous
sources, including Roman law, ecclesiastical law, and quite probably independent sources of Germanic law.194 According to Goebel, the Romans recognized two grounds for depriving an infamous individual of
the rights and privileges enjoyed by citizens in good standing. Infamia

juris resulted from actions that contravened the law. Infamiafacti occurred when the individual repeatedly engaged in legal but "morally
reprehensible" activity. 195 Goebel stresses that, in both Europe and
England, the Roman concept of infamy achieved such importance in
both secular and in church law that it ultimately became "basic to their
schemes of law enforcement, and eventually*to the whole structure of
human relationships."' 196 If Goebel accurately reconstructs the relationship between good name and social status, then it should be no surprise
NAL LAW 250-51 (1976). See also W. AULT, EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 228-29 (1946)

(describing the personal bond of homage central to the feudal relationship); R. BROWN, THE
ORIGINS OF MODERN EUROPE: THE MEDIEVAL HERITAGE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 119-

22 (1973) (describing the special commendation that paralleled the feudal knight's increase in
status); C. WOOD, THE AGE OF CHIVALRY: MANNERS AND MORALS 1000-1450, at 52-54
(1970) (discussing the critical role of honor in feudal system).
191 J. GOEBEL, supra note 190, at 70.
192 See id at 322.
193 See id at 255-57.
194 See id at 70-71 & nn.16-29.
195 The essence of the Roman idea was that for certain acts or because of a mode
of life an individual subjected himself to the moral censure of a competent
authority in the state, and that this entailed disqualification for certain rights
both in public and private law. In some types of cases infamia attached to the
mere making known before a magistrate of acts which would exclude from
public office or honor, whereas in other cases and notably criminal proceedings the infamy attached upon magisterial sentence. In addition to these
forms of infamia to which writers have given the name infamiajuris. . . is the
infamy of opinion which the legal texts indicate was based upon character or
standing. This has been called infamiafacti-factual infamy. The essence of
this conception was that persistent indulgence in acts morally reprehensible
but not themselves entailing infamy of law, would lead to disabilities because
such indulgence affects a man's character. The principle of application of
factual infamy was the same both in public and private [Roman] law, and the
disabilities such as the exclusion from office or honors, and the lessening of a
man's credibility as a witness were in some ways similar to those ensuing upon
infamriajuris.
J. GOEBEL, supra note 190, at 70 n.16 (citations omitted).
196

Id

at 73.
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that from the earliest time, English law treated reputation as a highly
valuable commodity. The creation of the civil defamation action might
thus be seen not merely as a socially acceptable way for an injured party
to vent his or her rage, but also as a means to protect an individual's
capacity to act as a full member of society. 19 7 The decision to recognize
truth as a complete defense in defamation made equally good sense. In
a society in which personal worth is the coin on which power and status
are traded, a person who reveals the truth about another's character
commits no wrong, but instead helps to preserve the foundations of the
society. Thus, accurate tale-telling would be encouraged and acceptable
behavior.
Historians' accounts of the structure of English society support the
notion that gossip, although occasionally irksome, was on the whole perceived as having genuine social value. Stone maintains that during the
period from 1500 to 1800, close observation by one's neighbors, servants,
and members of the extended kinship group was an immutable fact of
life for rich and poor alike. 198 Living conditions and prevailing social
mores led people to expect little privacy, even in the home. 199 Even
sexual intimacies were somewhat public events. 2°0 Not surprisingly,
prying, observing, and gossiping about the behavior of others were commonplace, and the ecclesiastical courts entertained an active trade in
denunciations of misbehavior and sexual peccadillos. 2 0 In addition to
the controls exerted by the church, the secular authorities and neighbors
themselves used devices from stocks to skimmingtons to chastise observed deviations from behavioral norms.2 0 2 A society so dependent on
gossip as a form of social control understandably would be reluctant to
197
198
199
200

See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 78, at 484.
See L. STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800 (1977).
Id

at

253-57.

The common practice among the poor of the sharing of beds by two, three, or
even four persons made even visual sexual privacy impossible. In Elizabethan
Essex, court records quite incidentally turn 'upevidence of a man having intercourse with a girl while her sister was in the same bed and of a case in
which the girl's mother was in the same bed. There was simply nowhere else
to go, and there is every reason to suppose that this indifference to sexual
privacy persisted well into the nineteenth century; in fact, until working-class
housing began to be slightly less grossly overcrowded.
Id at 256. Even among the rich, sexual privacy was scarce until the introduction of hallways
and rooms set aside for sleeping in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Before then,
rooms opened into one another and families used them for multiple functions so that sexual
privacy was not secure even within the upper classes. Id at 8, 253-54; see generaly D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 20-21 (1972).
L. STONE, supra note 198, at 93.
201
202 Id at 144-45. Stone describes the skimmington as a

form of public humiliation in
which the malefactor was paraded around the town seated backwards on a donkey. Id The
"parade" could also proceed with another person or an effigy to represent the unfaithful or
scolding spouse. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 2133 (1976).
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discourage truthful speech by making it a basis of liability in a defamation action.

The Star Chamber ultimately abolished truth as a defense to libel.
The alteration in the law, however, arose from pragmatic political considerations, and not from a change of heart about the underlying morality of unpleasant truthfulness. 20 3 The Chamber was trying to preserve
political stability in a troubled time 20 4 and to exert control over the potentially subversive and powerful printing presses. 20 5 It also hoped to
preserve the public peace by offering criminal punishment to avenge
insults as a substitute for the duel. 20 6 In fact, until almost the turn of the
nineteenth century there was no hint that an individual who revealed
another's misdeeds, misfortunes, and personal failures would generally
20 7
have been perceived as guilty of wrongdoing.
Charles Fox was perhaps the first to raise doubts about the morality
of the defense of truth. 20 8 In the parliamentary debates that preceded
the passage of the 1791 Libel Law in England, Fox argued against making truth a complete defense in criminal libel, claiming that it would be
wrong to give legal protection to someone who reveals another's inescapable personal misfortunes or physical defects. 20 9 Fox's argument is
203 See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
204 Veeder, supra note 74, at 561-63. For descriptions of the political instability of the
period, see generally G. CLARK, ENGLISH HISTORY, A SURVEY (1971); D. HUME, THE HisTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688
(abr. ed. 1975); 5-7 THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (W. Hunt & R. Poole eds. 1919).

205 Church and state alike shared the hope of preventing the spread of "pernicious" ideas
by controlling or prohibiting the writing and distribution of books. The invention of the
printing press made such control far more difficult and created the need for a more efficient
and ruthless form of censorship. The Crown limited the privilege of printing to the so-called
Stationer's Company and imposed rigorous penalties for unauthorized publications. Veeder,
supra note 74, at 561-63; see also Kelly, supra note 89, at 300-01.
206 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
207 Blackstone, for example, bluntly stated that a plaintiff could not collect damages in a
civil suit for true statements because the plaintiff "has received no injury at all." W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 88, at * 126. He added:
[Where there is no injury, the law gives no remedy. And this is agreeable to
the reasoning of the civil law;. . . (it is not just and right that he who exposes
the faults of a guilty person should be condemned on that account; for it is
proper and expedient that the offences of the guilty should be known).
Id at *125.
208

29 PARL. HIST. ENG. 575 (1817).

209 Fox admitted that it would be an unusual case in which truth would not be a defense,
but offered the following as an example:
Suppose, for instance, a man had any personal defect or misfortune, any thing
disagreeable about his body, or was unfortunate in any of his relations, and
that any person went about exposing him on those accounts, for the purpose
of malice, and that all these evils were day after day brought forward, to
make a man's life unhappy to himself, and tending to hold him out as the
object of undeserved contempt and ridicule to the world, which was too apt to
consider individuals as contemptible for their misfortunates, rather than odious for their crimes and vices. ...
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perhaps the most sympathetic of those raised against the defense of
2 10
truth, because it was designed to protect the innocent from injury.
Not until 1843, however, did anyone appear to argue seriously
about the moral injustice of the defense of truth in civil case law. In
1843, Lord Campbell recommended that Parliament eliminate truth as
an absolute defense in civil defamation cases. 21' His concern was
broader than Fox's; he wanted to protect repentent wrongdoers as well
as those innocents cursed by fate with unpleasant ailments or unsavory
relatives. It was unjust, he argued, to allow defamers who dredged up
the long-forgotten misdeeds of others to hide behind the defense of truth
unless they could demonstrate that the public would benefit from their
revelations.2 12 Although Parliament declined to follow Lord Campbell's
advice, 2 13 his plea helped trigger debate over the reasons for the defense,
and helped set the stage for the Warren-Brandeis proposal that the civil
214
courts recognize an interest in "privacy."
Around the same time, Thomas Starkie abandoned Blackstone's explanation that truth was a defense because accurate statements were a
social good. Instead, Starkie argued that the sole basis for denying recovery to plaintiffs for truthful defamations was the plaintiff's failure to
come to court with "clean hands. ' 2 15 Starkie's argument was influential, but not everyone rushed to embrace the more neutral "cleanhands" theory as an explanation of the defense of truth. For example,
Thomas Cooley, from whom Warren and Brandeis adopted the famous
phrase "the right to be let alone, '21 6 adhered to the traditional view:
The law has never conferred upon any one the right to be protected
against the damaging effect of the truth concerning his character. If
he has been enabled to put on a good outward appearance by cover210
211
212
213
214

See I T. STARKIE, supra note 74, at lxiv-lxv n.g.
See 70 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 1252-53 (1843).
See 69 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) 1229-32 (1843).
Lord Campbell's Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 96.
No state in the United States made truth a limited defense in civil defamation until

after the debate over and the passage of the 1843 British Act. Id The Supreme Court of
Wyoming referred to the testimony of Lord Brougham and the Report of the House of Lords
Committee on Libel to explain why Wyoming chose to limit the defense of truth in civil
defamation. See Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 63 Wyo. 416, 447-48, 182 P.2d 801,
813 (1947). The Supreme Court of the United States noted that "the law of privacy . . .
evolved to meet Lord Campbell's reservations ... " Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73
n.9 (1964).
215 "It may, therefore, be more consistent to consider the plaintiff as having excluded
himself from the protection of the law by his own misconduct, than to attribute the exemption to any merit appertaining to his adversary." IT. STARKiE, supra note 74, at 231-32. In
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967), Justice Harlan, writing for the plurality, explained that the defense of truth as originally contemplated was "more readily explained as a manifestation of judicial reluctance to enrich an undeserving plaintiff than by
the supposition that the defendant was protected by the truth of the publication."
216 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF TORT 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
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ing himself with the mantle of hypocrisy, it is not illegal for public
inquiry and contempt to tear this away. A dishonest man is not
wronged when his good repute is destroyed by exposure. 2 17
Although nineteenth- and twentieth-century writers have expressed
increasing skepticism about the preference for truth over privacy, and
have exhibited increasing empathy for those whose acts are exposed by
true statements, 2 18 studies continue to show that a free exchange of personal information plays the same central role in maintaining the social
cohesiveness of modem communities that it played in English towns 300
2 19
or more years ago.
b. The Function and Persistence of Gossip in Comtemporaq Li. Superficial differences, of course, do exist between contemporary practices and
those of early England and America. Spying through keyholes and
chinks in walls 2 20 is now as unacceptable as maintaining dunking stools
and public whippings. Our mobile and industrial society offers opportunities for anonymity unimagined by inhabitants of the small, cohesive
towns and villages of rural England and early America. 22 1 Yet, contem217 T. COOLEY, supra note 216, at 32. Modem writers have made similar arguments,
suggesting that the right to privacy in its private-facts guise is a kind of legally sanctioned
misrepresentation. See Epstein, Pdvacy, Property Rights, and Mitiresentation, 12 GA. L.
REV.
455, 469-74 (1978). See generally Posner, supra note 185.
218 One writer describes in the following way the changes in the circumstances of life
that
generated greater support for privacy:
The growth of literacy and increased education, and the gradual involvement of larger and larger sections of the adult population [during the late
19th century] in education and politics, extended the radius of attention.
People did not cease to be interested in their neighbors; but they had to contend with the increased resistance of their neighbors to being known and with
increased difficulties in knowing about them. Many more persons became
interested in affairs more remote than the affairs of their neighbors. The intense desire to penetrate into the affairs of one's neighbors was probably attenuated by the increased interestingness of the affairs of the larger world.
This made for a greater ease in the maintenance of privacy.
Shils, supra note 9, at 290. A number of modem sociologists and anthropologists, however,
would quarrel with Shils's assumption that the enlargement of the world in which ordinary
citizens became interested was accompanied by a diminished interest in the lives of
their
neighbors. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
219
See, e.g., A. BLUMENTHAL, SMALL-TOWN STUFF 135-43 (1932); G. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COMMUNITIES 36-37 (1972); A. VIDICH
& J. BENSMAN, SMALL
TOWN IN MASS SOCIETY: CLASS, POWER AND RELIGION IN A RURAL
COMMUNITY (rev. ed.

1968); J. WEST, PLAINVILLE, U.S.A. (1945); Abrahams, A Performance-CnteredApproach
to Gossip, 5 MAN 290 (1970); Paine, What Is Gossip About? An Alternative Hypothesis, 2 MAN 278
(1967). Anthropologist Max Gluckman, commenting on a modem study of the function
of
gossip, found that "[g]ossip does not have isolated roles in community life, but is part of
the
very blood and tissue of that life." Gluckman, Gossip and Scandal, 4 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 307, 308 (1963).
220 Stone describes historically the extent of surreptitious surveillance by servants within
the homes of middle and upper classes. See L. STONE, supra note 198, at 253-54.
221 See supra note 2 18; see also A. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 219, at 108 (proposing that
one
reason individuals in the American town he studied moved to larger cities was to escape
the
degree of observation and control exerted in a small town by increasing their anonymity).
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porary communities still enjoy considerable knowledge about the private lives of individual members, and still use that knowledge to
preserve and enforce social norms.222 This appears to be true across all
social strata, 2 23 in urban neighborhoods as well as in small towns and
rural areas. 224 To a large extent, the development of modern popular
journalism paralleled the growth of less intimate communities. 225 The
press, therefore, when it provides information about the private lives of
both famous and ordinary people, could be viewed merely as performing a traditional function that no longer can be accomplished by person226
to-person gossip alone.
Moreover, gossip-the exchange of personal information about
character, habits and lifestyles--does not merely serve as an instrument
of social control. Students of the phenomenon claim that gossip, and
the rules governing who participates and who is privy to what information about whom, helps mark out social groupings and establish community ties. 227 By providing people with a way to learn about social
222 A wide variety of commentators have made this point. See, e.g., J. WEST, supra note
219, at 99. West also describes a number of so-called gossip groups in the town that he studied, and quotes a citizen referring to one such group: "They drive sin into the timber." Id at
105; see also A. WEsTrN, supra note 9, at 20; Abrahams, supra note 219, at 296-97; Gluckman,
supra note 219, at 308.
223 Gluckman suggests that the degree of interest in the lives of other social groups, royalty, film stars, and sports personalities that permeates modern western society points to a
need for more intensive study of this phenomenon. See Gluckman, supra note 219, at 315.
224 Suttles describes the functions of gossip in an urban neighborhood as quite similar to
those described by others in small towns. See G. SUTTLES, supra note 219, at 36-37.
225 Historian Daniel Boorstin claims that the urbanization of the United States really
took place in the century following the Civil War. See D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 247 (1973). The first census to distinguish between urban and
rural dwellers was that of 1870. See id at 267. During the post-Civil War period, the newspaper industry also underwent a dramatic expansion. From 1860 to 1889, the number of daily
newspapers published in the United States increased from 387 to more than 1,500. Circulation also increased during that time more than a thousand-fold. D. PEMBER, supra note 14, at
10. In contrast, Pember reports that in 1790 only eight daily newspapers were published in
the entire country. Id at 5.
226 In an urbanized society, direct observation and back-fence discussion of the foibles,
habits, and lifestyles of other members of the community are prevented by the anonymity
produced by a large population, impersonal apartment houses, distant work places, and other
factors. Because the need for information about the personal lives of others is a widespread
and persistent phenomenon, media reporting emphasizing lifestyles and personalities helps to
fill the vacuum. See McQuail, The Mass Media and Privacy, in PRIVACY 177-214 (J. Young ed.
1978); O'Brien, The Right of Privay, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 443 (1902); Posner, supra note

185, at 395-97. McQuail, a sociologist, notes
the extent to which press activity which seems to conflict with norms of privacy and confidentiality may actually perform an essential function in a society which is increasingly impersonal and governed by experts and
bureaucratic organizations. In brief, the media have an implicit obligation to
serve the public interest, by protecting and enlarging a "sphere of the public"
in matters of morality and belief as well as of information.
McQuail, supra, at 191.
227 Gluckman, supra note 219, at 308-15. According to Gluckman:
[W]hen we try to understand why it is that people in all places and at all
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groups to which they do not belong, gossip increases intimacy and a
sense of community among disparate individuals and groups. Gossip
may also foster the development of relationships by giving two strangers
the means to bridge a gap of silence when they are thrown together in a
228
casual social situation.
Thus, from the perspective of the anthropologist and sociologist,
gossip is a basic form of information exchange that teaches about other
lifestyles and attitudes, and through which community values are
changed or reinforced. 229 This description is a far cry from that of Warren and Brandeis, which characterized gossip as a trivializing influence
that destroys "robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling" 2 30 and
232
23
serves the interests primarily of the "prurient" I and the "indolent.
Gossip thus appears to be a normal and necessary part of life for all
but the rare hermit among us. Perceived in this way, gossip contributes
directly to the first amendment "marketplace of ideas," and the comparative weight assigned to an interest in its limitation merits careful
consideration.
The Supreme Court noted in Time, Inc. v. Hill that "[e]xposure of
the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized
community. '233 The Court suggested that the primary cause of this risk
of exposure was the founders' initial decision to protect freedom of
speech. 23 4 That assertion is probably untrue. Rather, the risk is created
whenever any group of people bands together into any sort of a community at all. Interest in the details of one another's lives seems universal. 235 Thus, common sense suggests that courts and legislatures should

exercise caution before imposing legal sanctions against behavior that
times have been so interested in gossip and scandal about each other, we have
also to look at those whom they exclude from joining in the gossiping or scandalizing. That is, the right to gossip about certain people is a privilege which
is only extended to a person when he or she is accepted as a member of a
group or set.
Id at 313. f Paine, supra note 219, at 282.
228 Paine contends that gossip is an important and sometimes the sole way that information can be obtained to facilitate relationships between disparate groups, such as "[p]atronclient, landlord-tenant, producer-consumer" or "members of opposing political parties."
Paine, supra note 219, at 282; see also Gluckman, supra note 219, at 315 (gossip about sports
and entertainment personalities provides a basis for personal interchanges between transitorily associated individuals).
229 See supra note 218; see aso Posner, supra note 185, at 395-96. Posner suggests that
people need information about others to evaluate people correctly and to make personal
choices about lifestyles or careers.
230 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
231
232

Id
Id

233

385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).

234

See id

235

Gluckman, supra note 219, at 313.
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we may occasionally deplore but in which we all participate. The comment of one anthropologist makes this point quite pungently:
[I]f I suggest that gossip and scandal are socially virtuous and valuable, this does not mean I always approve of them. Indeed, in practice
I find that when I am gossiping about my friends as well as my enemies I am deeply conscious of performing a social duty; but that when
I hear they gossip viciously about me, I am rightfully filled with right236
eous indignation.

Perhaps, then, one reason that many private-facts cases seem at
times so dangerously near the edge of triviality is that the tort law mistakes the fundamental importance of the evil that it is designed to prevent. 237 Furthermore, the tort as broadly described by Warren and

Brandeis established a norm for behavior that deviates substantially
from ordinary practices and that people would be unlikely and (perhaps
even unwise) to adopt. 238 As a general rule, legal standards for behavior
cannot vary too greatly from accepted community practices without cre-

Id at 315.
A wide variety of commentators are skeptical of the social importance of preventing
the publication of private facts. The study of the British Committee on Privacy, chaired by
the Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger, concluded that although 83% of the population surveyed
considered privacy to be highly important as a general matter, few viewed the press as a
236
237

serious threat to privacy. See

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, CMD.

5, No. 5012,

at 25 (1972). A recent American survey reached similar results. When asked to compare the
press to other institutions in the private sector, those polled regarded newspapers and television as the least imposing invader of privacy. Americans worry most about invasions by
government and business; in the private sector, they were most concerned about insurance,
finance and credit-card companies, and credit bureaus. Louis HARRIS & Assocs., INC., THE
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: A NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH SURVEY OF ATTITUDES ToWARDS PRIVACY 3, 6 (1981). Don Pember, in reviewing the American experience with the
private-facts tort, explains that most plaintiffs fail in such suits because judges believe that
"the evil [Warren and Brandeis] sought to remedy was largely mythical." D. PEMBER, supra
note 14, at 238. One of the most skeptical statements, however, comes from Professor Epstein:
"Privacy, however lofty its pedigree, is the least important tort for a civilized society. Its late
emergence testifies to its marginal role, not to its moral sophistication." Epstein, supra note
217, at 463; see also McQuail, supra note 226, at 178.
238
In Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177
(1954), the Utah Supreme Court declined to extend Utah's anti-misappropriation privacy
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-405,-406 (1953), to any publication of private information
in a medium operated for profit. The court stated:
The right of privacy, although of great value to individuals, does not contain
the vital social implications for the whole of society that exist in the allowance
of freedom of expression in motion pictures, showings of newsreels, biographies, historical plays and the'like. Where the right of privacy of the individual is pitted against the general weal, we give some consideration to the
precept that the best social policy is that which results in the greatest good to
the greatest number, unless application of this principle cuts into inviolable
rights of the individual.
2 Utah 2d at 264, 272 P.2d at 183; see also Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 255-56 (1966).
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ating a risk that the community will totally disregard the law. 239
Certainly, positive law may on occasion inspire dramatic changes
in ordinary behavior and notions of decency. The civil rights amend24 1
ments to the Constitution, 24 and the statutes that flowed from them,
have probably influenced external interactions as well as deeply ingrained psychological attitudes about race. Laws abolishing slavery and
reaffirming the ideal of human equality, however, proceed from impeccable sources in moral law and draw support from widely shared political ideals of personal worth and freedom in a democratic society.
One need not be a cynic about the private-facts tort to suspect that,
notwithstanding the advocacy of that particular interest in privacy, an
action for the hurt that flows from the exposure of embarrassing facts
taps no such source of fundamental moral law. 24 2 The private-facts tort
merely relies on a vague consensus that we should not cause one another
unnecessary pain, an agreement that we regularly temper by our tacit
preference for the freedom to dissect one another's lives and
243
characters.
239

Any standard by which the law can undertake to compel the people to regulate their conduct must be one generally and spontaneously accepted, so that
their approving judgment shall accompany the endeavor to enforce conformity. It must not be one that a majority of the people do not habitually observe, because if the majority of the people are law breakers, it is obvious that
only some extraneous power could ever enforce the law.

T. COOLEY, I A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 3, at 5 (4th ed. 1932).

240 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
241 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified 42 U.S.C. § 1971); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified 18 U.S.C. § 245).
242 See supra note 237. Negley maintains that the moral foundations of a right to privacy
are unclear:

What has not been discussed. . . is why privacy is commonly considered a
right or a value to be protected by the law. There is no historical consensus,
in philosophy, politics, or law, that it is such a right. Few philosophers would
argue that privacy is a "natural" right or that the intrinsic nature of privacy
establishes it as a legal right.
Negley, PhilosophicalViews on the Value ofPrivay, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 319 (1966).
Since Negley wrote his article, Bloustein has attempted to establish a philosophical foundation on which to rest the legal protection of privacy. See E. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND
GROUP PRIVACY (1978). He argues that the tort law of privacy was designed to protect the
fundamental integrity of each person's individuality. See id at 41-42. See generally Fried, Pivay: Economics andEthics;A Comment on Posner, 12 GA. L. REV. 423, 426-27 (1978) (expressing
a view similar to Bloustein's as to the interest protected by privacy law). Although highly
influential, Bloustein's position has not succeeded in eliminating serious questions about the
value of and justification for the private-facts tort. Indeed, Bloustein admits that identifying
a moral foundation for privacy does not necessarily tell us whether the law should enforce the
right. See id at 42-43.
243 Roscoe Pound and Patrick Devlin have discussed the limits of the law in enforcing
moral claims. Pound cautioned against trying to make law "do the work of the home and of
the church," Pound, The Limits of Eective Legal Action, 3 A.B.A. J. 55, 56 (1917), and against
attempting "to enforce over-high ethical standards and to make legal duties out of moral
duties which are not sufficiently tangible to be made effective by legal means." Id at 61. He
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The private-facts tort is thus both constitutionally and practically
untenable. A serious effort to enforce a general right to be free of unwanted publicity about private facts would probably be as successful as
the attempt to enforce temperance through the ill-fated eighteenth
amendment, or the effort to use the law to prevent extramarital sexual
244
intercourse.
B.

The Mass-Communication Element: An Attempt to Avoid More
of the Right to Privacy Than Society Can Afford

The practical problems of proscribing widespread, socially important behavior may explain, at least in part, why most courts limit the
private-facts tort's scope by requiring mass or widespread communication as an element of the cause of action. 24 5 Judges either tacitly or
expressly recognize that they would create an impossible legal tangle if
they subjected back-fence and front-parlor gossip to liability. 246 Thus,
suggested that when we make such attempts the law becomes ineffectual or unenforceable.
See id at 56. Devlin writes that we expect a gap between law and our moral ideals. In his
view, law can only set the lower limit on acceptable behavior, and cannot, in and of itself,
effectively create a society that lives up to the highest ideals of human behavior. P. DEVLIN,
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 19-20 (1965). When commentators disagree about the morality of discussing one another's private lives, and when gossip is practiced as widely and for
such a variety of reasons as it is in this society, positive law should probably accept ordinary
practices as the lower limit of tolerable behavior. See also infra note 244.
244
See J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1969). Gusfield's observations about the efforts to control alcoholic
beverages apply equally well to the effort to enforce the law against public exposure of private
facts. Social deviance from the legal ideal regarding temperance was also widespread. Moreover, the temperance movement originated with an elite group, the New England Federalists,
who wished to impose their moral standards on an increasingly diverse population over which
the elite no longer exercised political control. Id at 5. The origin of the private-facts tort is
strikingly similar. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying notes 303-05.
Even when a significant correlation initially exists between moral perceptions and actual
behavior, law based on morals can eventually become ineffectual. Many moral precepts
change or dissipate over time, leaving behind a body of law that quickly becomes irrelevant,
or worse, produces undesirable results. One such example is the so-called heart balm torts
protecting against breaches of sexual fidelity, alienation of affection, and other assaults on
family relations. Many jurisdictions no longer permit such actions. See general/ REPORT OF
COMMrrTEE ON PRIVACY, CMD. 5, No. 5012 (1972) (regarding shifting notions of privacy);
W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 124, at 873-88 (4th ed. 1971); Brown, The Actionfor Alienation of
Affctions, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472 (1934) (favoring retention of the action); P. DEVLIN, supra
note 243, at 18 (contending moral standards do not shift, but that the extent to which society
tolerates deviations from such standards varies from generation to generation); Feinsinger,
Legislative Attack on "HeartBalm," 33 MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935) (favoring legislative correction
of tort and contract remedies); Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Perso." A Moral
Argument for the Decriminalizationof Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1198, 1234 (1979)
(suggesting that desynchronization between law and morals is most likely to occur when
moral views "rest on mere social convention," rather than on something more fundamental).
245
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977).
246 See, e.g., LaFontaine v. Family Drug Stores, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 66, 73, 360 A.2d
899,902 (Conn. C.P. 1976) (in a false-light action, court says abandonment of mass-publicity
requirement "would expand the concept of invasion of privacy beyond manageable limits").
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the prevailing practice, which limits liability almost exclusively to the
media, seems often to be more a pragmatic than a principled policy.
Warren and Brandeis originally may have envisioned a principled
distinction between tortious and nontortious publication when they suggested the mass-communication element of the tort. They agreed that a
plaintiff might possibly recover in the rare instance in which oral, limited communications of private information resulted in special damages. 24 7 But they believed that the injury from private gossip would
"ordinarily be. . .trifling," and hence not actionable. 248 They wished
primarily to protect an individual's right to what might be called selective anonymity-the principle that each of us should be able to control,
with few exceptions, the circles within which details of our lives and
characters are disseminated. 249 Thus, they logically distinguished gossip
among friends and acquaintances from the publication of the same information in a newspaper. 250 This rationale for the mass-communication requirement of the tort no longer is accepted. Selective anonymity
as a theory quickly proved too broad to reconcile with even conservative
notions of free speech and press. The trend in the case law toward narrowing the definition of private information and expanding the privilege for press publications of newsworthy information clearly
demonstrates that jurisdictions today reject selective anonymity as a le25
gally protectible interest. '
In modern times, Professor Bloustein has most cogently rejustifled
the mass-publicity requirement. He argues that the private-facts tort (as
well as other kinds of privacy protections) is designed to afford legal
protection to the individual's fundamental human dignity. 252 That interest is damaged, says Bloustein, not when friends learn things that
change their opinions of us, but when we are "made a public spectacle."' 253 The difference, in his view, is that private gossip has "a kind of
human touch and softness, '254 and its effect is moderated by the tendency of at least some listeners to "know and love or sympathize with
the person talked about. ' 255 In contrast, newsprint (and presumably
Contra Norris v. Kind, 355 So. 2d 21, 24 (La. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 995 (1978)
(nonmedia defendant should be more vulnerable to liability in private-facts.cases because
private communicators do not serve the public interest in same way that broad dissemination
by press does); Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 104-05, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (1977) (eroding the mass-publicity requirement).
247 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 217 & n.4.
248 See id at 217.
249 See id at 214-15.
250 See id at 217 n.4.
251 See infra notes 268-373 and accompanying text.
252 See E. BLouSTEIN, supra note 242, at 41-42. But see O'Brien, supra note 226, at 443
(suggesting that people are often gratified by publicity and public attention).
253 E. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 242, at 20.
254 Id at 23.
255

Id
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telecasts) is "cold and impersonal" and not subject to the tempering influences that may create sympathy or at least tolerance among
256
neighbors.
Several problems arise with this defense. First, although human
dignity is an important value, it is hard to define, identify, and measure.
Moreover, the existence of an arguably fundamental interest in dignity
does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the law can or should
shield it from all possible assaults. 25 7 Many important human values,
such as loyalty to friends or the love of parents for their children, are
either unprotected by law entirely or can be enforced by it only
tangentially.
Second, the factual assumptions that underlie Bloustein's hypothesis about the difference between press coverage and back-fence gossip
are questionable. It is not at all clear that the exposure of personal information to people who have no particular interest in the plaintiff's life
is more damaging than circulation to those who do know the plaintiff
25 8
and who have a personal stake in discovering whatever they can.
Most people are embarrassed and hurt by the exposure of private
facts because such revelations may alter the way that others see themnot necessarily in the sense that it will cause classic reputational injury,
but in the sense that it will create a deviance between the image that
they want to project of themselves and the one that others will actually
form.2 59 As a practical matter, the subjects of unwanted publicity are
likely to be concerned primarily with how they are viewed by people
who know them. The opinions of strangers are far less likely to matter
256

Id

257

Bloustein agrees that identification of the values protected by privacy law does not

necessarily mean that such law should exist. See id at 42-43. Nevertheless, he advocates
preserving the tort law in this area. See id at 62, 83.
258 The Michigan Supreme Court, which has begun to erode the mass-publicity requirement, clearly disagrees with Bloustein's argument that widespread publicity is more harmful
than local gossip:
Communication of embarrassing facts about an individual to a public not
concerned with that individual and with whom the individual is not concerned obviously is not a "serious interference" with plaintiff's right to privacy .

. .

. An invasion of a plaintiff's right to privacy is important if it

exposes private facts to a public whose knowledge of those facts would be
embarrassing to the plaintiff. Such a public might be the general public, if
the person were a public figure, or a particular public such as fellow employees, club members, church members, family, or neighbors, if the person were
not a public figure.
Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 104-05, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (1977). Sociological studies
support Michigan's position. See, e.g., A. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 219, at 140, 144, 180-81.
The subjects of gossip in a small town often escape hurt feelings because social convention
protects them from learning in most cases what is being said. See A. VIDICH & J. BENSMAN,
5upra note 219, at 42-44. Failure to learn about gossip, however, does not mean that the
subject of it has not been harmed.
259 See Gavison, siira note 9, at 423, 450-55.
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intensely. 260 An example used by Westin clearly illustrates this difference. He observes that individuals are often more open and honest
about themselves with strangers than they are with friends or acquaintances. He suggests that a person is often able to elicit objective advice
from the stranger, fully aware that the stranger "is able to exert no au26t
thority or restraint over the individual."
In addition, Bloustein's distinction between press coverage and
back-fence gossip assumes without support that the tempering effects of
human sympathy and mutual protectiveness are absent in the wider audience that receives its information from the media rather than from
friends or neighbors. The ability to empathize with strangers and even
with totally fictional characters is surely a major element in our appreciation of literature and largely explains our taste for so-called human
interest stories in the press. Moreover, some appreciation for another's
predicament may well limit what an individual will tell a reporter about
another person, in much the same way that similar self-protective instincts may limit his willingness to indulge in personal gossip with
friends. In fact, current public mores about what is and is not "fit to
print" probably exert a more effective control over privacy violations by
the press, which remains economically sensitive to the tastes of its audience, than over the private gossip mill. 26 2 For instance, an Idaho television station, clearly worried about audience and sponsor reactions, fired
an employee who allowed a few seconds of nudity to appear on an eve263
ning newscast.
In reality, the most important distinction between press coverage
and gossip seems to be in its visibility to the victim. 26 Although we may
suspect that our friends secretly talk about us, we know exactly what has
been said when information about us appears in the press. Thus, our
feelings are less likely to be hurt by private gossip, even though our
images may suffer every bit as much as they do from more public disclosures. The distinction between press coverage and gossip may be important to our subjective sense of well-being, but it appears to be a dubious
basis for imposing liability only on mass communicators of public facts,
especially in light of the serious infringement on the press and free
260
261
262
263

See supra note 258.
A. WESTIN, supra note 9, at 31-32.
See infra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
See Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 206, 525 P.2d 984, 989 (1974) (Shephard,

Cj., dissenting).
264 In a study of "Springdale," a community in upstate New York, researchers discovered
that part of the social ethic of gossip was that "one [need] not confront the subject of gossip
with what is said about him." This ethic enables surface cordiality to be maintained, even
between enemies. A. VicH & J. BENSMAN, supra note 219, at 44. But see A. BLUMENTHAL,
supra note 219, at 108, 129 (although the people in the community who were studied often did
not know what was said about them, they were well aware that they were subjects of discussion in the community and often found that knowledge uncomfortable).
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26 5
speech that such a limitation engenders.
The mass-publicity requirement of the private-facts tort, therefore,
probably exists solely to cut off an intolerably attractive invitation to the
hypersensitive and litigious, and not in response to valid differences in
the capacity of public versus private gossip to cause harm. If this is true,
the mass-publicity requirement only throws into sharper relief the implausibility of the underlying rationale of the tort as a whole. If, in our
social judgment, highly personal gossip is so damaging that it necessitates some protection by the state, then surely the identity and audience
size of the gossiper should ordinarily be irrelevant to a finding of liability. If, on the other hand, we believe that gossip and its harms are, as a
general matter, unsuitable for legal control, we should not single out the
press for liability that we would not willingly impose on one another.
To summarize, a state can justify a content-based regulation of
speech, such as the private-facts tort, only if it can demonstrate a clearly
defined harm and a compelling interest in its prevention. 266 But the
nature of the harm done by publication of private facts has continued
for almost a century to elude more than vague, subjective definition.
Furthermore, because society has a powerful countervailing interest in
exchanges of accurate information about the private lives and characters of its citizenry, a compelling case for a general right to suppress such
exchanges is difficult to construct. Many decades ago, a commentator
on the budding tort of invasion of privacy cautioned that publicity
about our private affairs may be among the "impertinent and disagreeable things which one may suffer" but which do not "amount to legal
injuries such as courts may redress. ' 267 However uncomfortable that
conclusion is, it may well have turned out to be right.

IV
THE POSSIBILITY THAT A NARROW RIGHT TO RECOVER
FOR PUBLICATION OF PERSONAL FACTS COULD
BE PRESERVED, CONSISTENT WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

Even those writers most sensitive to the constitutional thorniness of
the private-facts tort have nonetheless insisted that it could be so shaped
as to salvage a cause of action for those plaintiffs who suffer particularly
painful publicity. For the sake of argument, let us assume that some
particular facts are so intimate and revealing that their disclosure would
probably cause most individuals serious distress and strain their relationships with others. Let us also assume that compensation of these
individuals for that harm is a sufficiently substantial state interest to
265

See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.

266
267

See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
O'Brien, supra note 226, at 439.
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justify limitation of the defendant's right of free speech. At the same
time, common sense and concern that free speech not be choked off at
the roots require some limits on the extent to which communications
can be made tortious. Courts and legislatures must therefore face the
difficult process of delineating standards that permit recovery in serious
cases, while not also encouraging costly litigation over injuries that are
2 68
more trivial.
This narrowed tort would have to be defined precisely and clearly
enough that a publisher would have fair warning of the approximate
location of the line between protected and unprotected revelations. Although the Supreme Court has consistently refused to rule that any
speech-including accurate speech-is absolutely protected by the Constitution,2 69 the Court has also been equally insistent that the Constitution condemns vague regulation. The Court has stated repeatedly that
vague proscriptions against speech may chill the willingness of individuals and the media to take part in those communicative activities that are
clearly protected by the first amendment.2 7 0 The Court has developed
268 The British Committee on Privacy concluded that the delineation of a right to privacy would be so difficult and time-consuming, and so threatening to free speech, that it
recommended against adoption of the tort in Great Britain. The Committee compared the
issues in privacy to those in obscenity: "We already have some experience of the uncertainties
which result . . . in obscenity cases, when courts of law are asked to make judgments on
controversial matters, where statutory definitions are unsatisfactory, and social and moral
opinion fluctuates rapidly." REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, CMD. 5, No. 5012, at

206 (1972).
269
The Supreme Court has permitted regulation of certain kinds of speech because, for
one reason or another, they fall outside the ambit of first amendment speech. See, e.g., Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (permitting state proscription of negligent
and intentional lies about a private person); United States v. Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(permitting state regulation of obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (permitting state regulation of fighting words likely to breach the peace). But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (casting doubt on the continuing validity of the Court's
reasoning in Chaplinsky). Of these, obscenity and perhaps fighting words could involve accurate communications. The Court has left open the possibility of prior restraints on true
speech in a very narrow group of cases in which the communication at issue is a matter of
profound concern to national security. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931). The Court has also suggested the possible availability of a prior restraint when publication creates an unusual risk to
an individual's constitutional right to a fair trial. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 562-70 (1976). Additionally the Court has hinted that criminal punishment could be
appropriate for the reporting of certain kinds of accurate but harmful information, but has
set a standard so high and narrow that the state must offer an extremely strong showing of
harm in order to justify penalizing such speech. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). One of the
few recent cases in which the Court permitted a penalty to be imposed for presumably accurate speech was Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). Snepp, however, involved a
potential threat to national security, and the Court regarded Snepp not as a first amendment
case, but as a contract case involving breach of a fiduciary duty. See id at 510.
270 See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,572-73 (1974) (statute prohibiting "contemptuous" treatment of American flag void because it provides inadequate notice of forbidden
conduct and invites selective enforcement); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (vague
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the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth to address this concern.
Fear of a chilling effect has led the Court to protect even undesirable speech. In Sullivan, the Court immunized from tort liability some
speech that, in its view, did not further first amendment interests because it wanted to prevent inhibition of speech that did contribute to
the marketplace of ideas. 271 Even when the Court decided to relax free
speech protections in Gertz to facilitate private recovery for libel, it emphasized as one element in its decision that the content of the publica2 72
tion at issue gave clear warning of its potentially defamatory nature.
Thus, the danger zone in Gertz was clearly enough marked to put the
speaker on notice of a special duty to exercise reasonable care in checking factual assertions for accuracy.
The problem of finding clear and precise demarcations between
protected and unprotected speech in the private-facts area actually occupied the attention of judges and scholars even before the Supreme
Court began developing modern free speech law. 273

No court has

wanted to grant plaintiffs carte blanche to veto what could be said
about them by mass communicators. Yet, after all the years devoted to
the task, no one has yet developed a set of satisfactory and uniformly
applied definitional standards.
Warren and Brandeis themselves conceded that their proposed tort
was subject to some limitations and should not create a right to sue for
any unauthorized publication. It is unclear whether they created these
limitations to protect the free flow of information, to prevent the courts
from sinking under an avalanche of litigation, or both.2 74 But, certainly,
statute violates first amendment); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (statute defining solicitation of business unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); see also supra notes 107-09

and accompanying text.
271
376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); see supra text accompanying notes 102-06. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 496 (1975) (public interest in vigorous press overrides interests of privacy when the facts are of legitimate public concern and obtainable from public
records).
272 See 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
273 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 202-04,50 S.E. 68, 73-74
(1905). Although Pavesich would be classified today as a misappropriation case, the Georgia
court squarely addressed the problem of deciding when the publication of true information is
constitutionally protected and when it is an abuse of freedom of speech. Modern Supreme
Court law in the first amendment area began later with the Espionage Act cases during
World War I. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618-19 (1919) (circulars
designed to incite general strike not protected by first amendment); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (advocating disobedience of draft created "clear and present danger" and was therefore subject to prohibition). See general , Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES (1941).
274 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-18. The article does not reveal the authors' reasons for imposing limits on the right to sue, except to suggest cryptically that "only
the more flagrant breaches of decency and propriety. . . could in practice be reached, and it
is not perhaps desirable even to attempt to repress everything which the nicest taste and
keenest sense of the respect due to private life would condemn." Id at 216.
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courts have recognized the free speech implications- of the private-facts
275
tort from the time of its adoption.
Whatever their motive, Warren and Brandeis proposed a test that
they believed would distinguish cases where liability was justified from
those where it was not. 2 76 To be actionable, a revelation would have to
involve "private" information, and not the sort of information in which
277
the public maintained a "legitimate" interest.
A.

Private Information: The Various Tests
1. The Status of the Plaintiffas a Gauge ofPrivate Information

Warren and Brandeis deemed information private if it involved
"the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an individual," or similar
matters. 278 Warren and Brandeis added, however, that some limited information that would otherwise fall into this prohibited category could
be published without liability if it pertained to a person who was active
in "public life." Information bearing on the person's fitness for a public
role would be immune from liability even though it concerned the individual's "private" sphere of activities. 279 Thus, Warren and Brandeis
defined the difference between public and private information both as a
function of the status of the individual, and of some public "need to
know. '280 Although they do not necessarily define these elements as
Warren and Brandeis did, the courts have adopted the "private information" and "public interest" criteria to reconcile tort law with conflicting free speech values.
Both criteria are eminently sensible in theory. If we wish to compensate people when they are hurt by the truth because the information
is "personal," we must be able to distinguish what is personal from what
is not. On the other hand, if the first amendment is intended to ensure
that debate over public affairs is vigorous and free, it also makes sense to
shield from liability that speech which contributes data to public
debate.
The "newsworthiness" privilege, 28 1 which protects information of
legitimate public interest from liability, nicely tracks modem theories of
See supra note 273.
They also proposed that the tort be subject to the same rules of privilege that applied
to defamation, see Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 216-17, that oral publication normally
not be actionable, see id at 217, and that no liability be imposed when the plaintiff either
published the information or consented to its publication, see id at 218.
277 Id at 214-16.
278 Id at 216.
279 Id According to Warren and Brandeis, a plaintiff was active in "public life" if he or
she sought, was considered for, or occupied a public office. Plaintiffs in "public or quasipublic position[s]" were also active in "public life." Id
280 Id at 215.
Seegenerall.y RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comments d, g (1977).
281
275
276
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the first amendment. Ideally, the privilege could provide both a comfortable definition of the line between protected and unprotected speech
and a way to avoid the need of resorting to a balancing of privacy
against free speech values. On this point, Alexander Meiklejohn argued
that the first amendment was designed not to protect speech as a general
matter, but to protect speech that contributes to the ability of the citizens in a democracy to govern themselves. 282 It would follow that
purely private speech (that which is not of "legitimate public interest")
does not contribute to the process of self-governance, and therefore is
not protected by the first amendment. States could thus subject such
speech to tort liability without implicating or conflicting with constitutional values.
The Supreme Court has lent credence to this analytic approach.
The political speech theory was a source of the rationale for New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 283 and is clearly reflected in case law developments
since then.284 The problem with the use of the public-private speech
distinction as a way to evade a conflict between the constitution and the
private-facts tort arises not from the theory, but from the attempt to
derive from it some workable definition of private, as opposed to public,
speech.
Warren and Brandeis believed that the classifications of "private"
and "newsworthy" (that is, "public") were merely different points on a
single continuum. They defined information as public or private based
as much on the identity of the individual discussed as on the subject
matter under discussion. 28 5 Although courts continue to talk about its
importance in privacy cases, the status approach as a way to distinguish
privileged from tortious speech has proved unproductive. The WarrenBrandeis limitation assumed no legitimate public need to know about
the personal lives and characters of others unless the information related
to the fitness of the individual for public office or positions of public
282 See Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255.
283 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). The Court describes the first amendment as securing "freedom of expression upon public questions," and as designed "to assure unfettered interchange

of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Id
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). Justice Black, in a concurrence
joined by Justice Douglas, cited Meiklejohn for the proposition that the first amendment

confers a privilege of unfettered speech on public affairs. See 376 U.S. at 297 n.6 (Black, J.,
concurring).
284 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976) ("[Tjhere is surely
a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between
pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance."); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,495 (1975) ("The freedom
of the press to publish [information from public records] appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct
of public business."). See generaly Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof

the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965).
285

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 215.
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power.2 8 6 Tested under modern first amendment standards, however,
this concept of public or political speech is far too narrow.
The Supreme Court has created a series of standards for libel
which, very much like the distinction made by Warren and Brandeis,
offer far greater protection to private than to public plaintiffs.

28 7

The

Court has clearly indicated, however, that at least where opinions, ideas,
nondefamatory falsehoods, and accurate factual speech are involved, the
status of the plaintiff is constitutionally irrelevant. 288 To decide otherwise would be to narrow severely the scope of protected first amendment
speech; the Court appropriately has shown little enthusiasm for excluding from protection the great bulk of information that informs the social, political, moral, and philosophical positions of individual citizens
but that is not itself strictly political or "public" in nature. 289 That reluctance is consistent with the Meiklejohn thesis. For example, the attitude of individual voters toward an administration's economic
philosophy may be influenced by their knowledge of the latest government economic indicators and the President's policy speeches and life
style. But the voters might be equally affected by a newspaper story
describing the impact of that economic philosophy on an ordinary automobile worker who has just collected his last unemployment check and
is unable to support his children or meet mortgage payments.
Because the position of the person whose life is publicized provides
no real means of distinguishing between speech which contributes to
self-governance and that which does not, efforts to define what is private
and what is newsworthy have, as a practical matter, turned from. status
considerations to a search for other relevant distinctions. 2 9 In the process, privacy and newsworthiness have come to be treated as more in286 See supra note 279.
287 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); sura notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
288 The Court has thus far failed to distinguish between public and private figures in
false-light privacy cases. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Nor did the Court suggest that such a distinction is
relevant in the only private-facts case it has decided, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975). The distinction does not appear in other areas of first amendment law,
either. The Court suggested in Cox that the relevant consideration is the public interest in the
information itself. Id at 495. Commentators have also criticized the use of the public-private
figure distinction in common law privacy cases and have urged courts to consider only the
degree of public interest in the information. See, e.g., Larremore, The Law of Pivaoy, 12
COLUM. L. REv. 693, 698-701 (1912) (calling distinction "abortive and futile"); Ragland, The
Right ofPrivac, 17 Ky. LJ. 85, 110-13 (1929).
289 See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (motion pictures
within scope of first amendment speech); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)
(fiction included in first amendment protection because "[w]hat is one man's amusement,
teaches another's doctrine").
290 The public-private figure distinction has also been troublesome in the private-facts
tort area because it suggests that all publications about public figures-however intimateare newsworthy. The Restatement Second rejects this view, arguing instead that even the best
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dependent concepts. Courts now typically decide first whether the
information at issue is of a kind that is truly private or intimate, and
then ask whether, nonetheless, it should be privileged because it is
4ewsworthy.
2. Location Analysis as a Means of Defining Private Information
To distinguish private facts from "public" information about an
individual, courts often look either to the location of the action or to the
nature of the subject matter. Courts using the "location" analysis commonly state that information individuals reveal about themselves in
public places is by definition not private. 29 1 Therefore, reports of such
revelations are not actionable merely because the press has further publicized the information.
Although the location argument is attractive, it fails as a rational
principle of distinction. First, what is a public place? For example, suppose that a tort claim is based on the allegation that the press has unjustly revealed that the plaintiff is a cocaine user. If a reporter obtained
that information by watching the plaintiff use the drug on a park bench
or a public street corner, courts generally agree that the reporter invades
no right of privacy by revealing what he or she has seen. But the plaintiff's use of the same drug in a private club, at a large house party before
fifty guests, or even in an intimate gathering 6f a few friends, poses logical difficulties for the location test. 292 In each case, the plaintiff acted in
view of others. A reporter may be present, or one of the guests may
describe the behavior to others including the reporter who writes of it.
In some senses, all these scenarios involve public action on the plaintiff's
part. It is not clear, however, which of these sites are "public" places. It
is also not clear what weight that distinction should carry in imposing
liability.
The exposure in private-facts tort cases almost always occurs because the plaintiff has not acted in seclusion, but has in some way publicized personal information to a select group of other people. The
element of self-exposure, a kind of "assumption of the risk," clearly inknown persons have some privacy protection. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D,
comment h (1977).
291
See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953);
Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 312, 95 P.2d 491, 496 (1939); Jacova v.

Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34,40 (Fla. 1955); Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa.
192, 196-97, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (1963); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
comment b (1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 117, at 808-09.
292
For examples of cases in which the plaintiff's reported behavior took place before
large groups of people, but not necessarily in a "public place" as narrowly defined, see Virgil
v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976) (plaintiff's bizarre
behavior exhibited at parties); Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co., 36 Conn. Supp. 239, 416
A.2d 1215 (1980) (plaintiffs held outdoor "unwedding" reception to celebrate divorce).
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fluenced the Younger Committee 293 in advising against creating a legal
right to privacy in Great Britain. The Committee concluded that if an
individual seriously wished to protect his or her privacy, such simple
devices as "guarded speech about one's personal affairs, care of personal
papers, caution in disclosing information on request, confining private
conduct to secluded places, and the use of curtains, shutters and frosted
glass" 294 were as likely to be effective as resort to a legal remedy.
3.

The "Subject Matter" Test of Private Facts

To avoid the pitfalls of the location test, or sometimes to augment
it, courts and commentators have also relied on a subject matter or
"zone of privacy" test.2 95 Embarrassing events sometimes occur over

which the individuals involved have little control, but which are undisputably "public" under the location test. Courts in these cases sometimes rule that the subject matter is private even though the locus is not.
For example, a woman's skirt was blown up around her waist as she
stepped over an air vent as she emerged from a funhouse at a public
fairground.2 96 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed an award of several thousand dollars against the newspaper that ran a picture of the
unfortunate woman on subject matter grounds, although it remains
questionable how the newspaper invaded her privacy by further publicizing an event that was witnessed as it occurred by hundreds if not
297
thousands of spectators.
Emerson supports a subject matter or "zone of privacy" test and
argues that courts can remove some of the uncertainty surrounding the
private-facts tort by identifying certain topics that are sufficiently intimate to establish in essence a prima facie case of liability.2 98 Emerson
293
REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON PRIVACY, CMD. 5, No. 5012 (1972). The Committee on Privacy is often referred to as the Younger Committee because its chairman was the
Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger.
294 Id at 25; see also Lundsgaarde, tivaqy: An AnthropologicalPerspective on the Right to Be
Let Alone, 8 Hous. L. REv. 858, 875 (1971) (questioning whether many invasions of privacy
would be possible without "active collaboration" of people willing to disclose private facts);
cf A. WESTIN, supra note 9, at 53 (people are willing to disclose confidential information to
public opinion pollsters when assured that their individual responses will remain
confidential).
295 See, e.g., Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762
(1956) (suggesting that photograph of dead body presents no serious privacy problem but
that showing body's sex organs would be invasion of privacy).
296 Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964).
297 The court conceded that the event had many eyewitnesses, and that because of its
indisputably "public" location it would ordinarily be privileged. Nonetheless, the court decided to create an exception to that rule for publications that are "offensive to modesty or
decency." Id at 383, 162 So. 2d at 477-78 (quoting Holcombe v. State, 5 Ga. App. 47, 62 S.E.
647 (1908)).
298 See Emerson, supra note 39, at 343-44; cf. Karafiol, supra note 32, at 529 ("[t]he controlling factor in overriding newsworthiness is not an invasion of privacy that is exceptionally
injurious as measured by the sensitivity of the average person in the community but an inva-
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considers as intimate "those activities, ideas or emotions which one does
not share with others or shares only with those who are closest. This
would include sexual relations, the performance of bodily functions,
family relations, and the like."' 299 Other commentators have suggested

3 °°
additional categories.
Like the location and status approaches, the subject matter approach has difficulties. It may be impossible to identify in advance appropriate categories that encompass the wide variety of possible fact
patterns that can occur. Publishers would still face some uncertainty as
to which subjects or facts invade privacy, and some chilling of free
speech would remain. 30 1 Moreover, categorical prohibitions may not
take adequate account of variations in what is perceived as "private."
For example, not all family relationships---even those rarely discussedare necessarily intimate. 30 2 Most importantly, it may be difficult to ascertain at any point in time, and certainly for any significant span of
time, which subject matters are so personal as to justify tort protection.
Public consensus is difficult to forge, hard to measure, and subject to
rapid shifts. 30 3 Differences of opinion over which subjects are offensive
can be found at any moment in history among different geographical
30 4
regions, or levels of social, economic, or educational status.

sion that intrudes on particular areas of private life as defined by community mores.');
Wright, Defamation, Privag, and the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem and a New Ap-

proach, 46 TEx. L. REV. 630, 636 (1968) (private matters are those "affecting only one man or
a group of men, but not so large a group as would constitute a community").
299
Emerson, supra note 39, at 343.
300
Professor Lusky would include other areas in which the individual should be given
total control over information about himself or herself-what is said in the confessional or the
psychiatrist's office, and what occurs in the voting booth and the jury room. See Lusky, Invasion of Privacy.: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 693, 709 (1972).
301
In contrast, Professor Emerson hopes that delineation of zones of privacy will eliminate the chilling effect and lessen the self-censorship that he believes the current, vaguer standards produce. See Emerson, supra note 39, at 344.
302
For example, the fact that I intensely dislike a relative may be something that I would
not object to having revealed because it would not embarrass me or otherwise be painful.
303
REPORT 'OF THE COMMrITTEE ON PRIVACY, CMD. 5, No. 5012, at 206 (1972);

Ashdown, Media Reporting and Pivacy Claims-Declinein ConstitutionalProtectionfor the Press, 66

KY. LJ. 759, 778 (1978).
304
"Class, occupation, education, and status within various communities and organizations may significantly affect the way in which an individual thinks of himself as a 'private'
individual and what he understands by 'the moral right to privacy'." Velecky, The Concept of
Pivacy, in PRIVACY 25 (J. Young ed. 1978). For an interesting example of the differences in
views of privacy according to social class, see A. VIDICH &J. BENSMAN, supra note 219, at 407.
The publication of the authors' study of a small town in upstate New York created serious
controversy because the subjects claimed that their right to privacy had been invaded. The
authors, commenting on the furor surrounding publication of their book, wrote:
There is an interesting parallel between the license taken by anthropologists and that taken by sociologists who have studied crime, minority groups,
caste groups, factory workers, prostitutes, psychopathic personalities, hoboes,
taxi-dancers, beggars, marginal workers, slum dwellers, and other voiceless,
powerless, unrespected, and disreputable groups. Negative reaction to community and organizational research is only heard when results describe artic-
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This tendency toward divergence of opinion emerges most clearly
with regard to sexual conduct and the display of the human body. Because most commentators include these areas among those that raise the
most serious privacy concerns, 3 05 the existence of radically different
standards is especially telling. In different parts of the country, a trip to
the beach may reveal extremes of dress from modest bathing suits to
partial or even total nudity. In the age of topless sunbathing, the bikini,
which was still scandalous only a decade ago, has become reasonably
conservative beachside attire.
In contrast, although we generally enjoy sexual intimacies in seclusion, our ancestors in Elizabethan England and colonial New England
typically shared sleeping quarters and even beds, making sexual intercourse a somewhat public act.30 6 Just as the modern nude sunbather

might be nonplussed by the thought of quasi-public sex, an Elizabethan
undoubtedly would have been shocked by modern casualness about
3 07
nudity.
Because a stable coalescence of opinion about what areas are genuinely private is unlikely, the zonal approach to defining "private" areas
creates two risks. First, some plaintiffs could recover for revelations that
the zonal approach defines as offensive, but that in fact did not especially offend the plaintiff or the court. Second, zones of privacy identified by legislation or judicial rule will tend to freeze into the legal system
social values that may be idiosyncratic with the lawmakers, or that the
public at large may widely share now but may abandon after a short
while. In either case, information might be inhibited that would ultimately prove useful to the process of public debate and societal change.
B.

The Newsworthiness Defense
If the attempt to define "private" information has proved difficult,

ulate, powerful, and respected individuals and organizations. We believe
there would have been no objection to our study if it had been limited solely
to the shack people [a social underclass in "Springdale"].
Id (footnote omitted). Vidich and Bensman's observation might suggest that certain social
groups are unable to articulate their sense of rage and make it heard. There is an equally
sound reason to suspect, however, that many of the groups that failed to complain would not,
in fact, see their privacy interests in the same light as did the mainstream residents of "Springdale." See supra note 301.
305 See supra note 295.
306 See supra note 200; see also A. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FAMmy 129-32 (1917). Calhoun noted that many early colonial homes had only one room and
one bed. This bed was commonly shared with guests. Even young men and women, if fully
clothed, could lie together. This practice, known as "bundling," was not viewed as improper
until after the French and Indian Wars. Id
307

See L. STONE, supra note 198, at 484 ("Concepts of sexual privacy and sexual shame

have varied enormously over time. Because of cramped living conditions, most of the human
race over most of history can never have enjoyed sexual privacy . . . . [Yet] full nudity
openly displayed in the light has very often been regarded as shameful.").
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the process of defining "newsworthy" information has practically destroyed the private-facts tort as a realistic source of a legal remedy.
More than a decade and a half ago, Harry Kalven noted that the newsworthiness privilege was "so overpowering as virtually to swallow the
tort. 30 s All information is potentially useful in some way to the public
in forming attitudes and values. Thus every communication is arguably
privileged.
1. Attempts to Define Newsworthiness: The PoliticalSpeech Model
Because all information is arguably "newsworthy," the private-facts
case law has been plagued by the same problem that has debilitated the
Meiklejohn political-speech theory as a useful tool for rationalizing first
amendment law. When Meiklejohn initially espoused the notion that
the first amendment was designed to protect "political" speech as opposed to other kinds of speech, commentators criticized him for his substantially underinclusive definition.30 9 Does the first amendment leave
unprotected most literature, art and learning not explicitly political in
nature? Meiklejohn countered that speech relating to the process of selfgovernance need not be "about" politics. Meiklejohn claimed that people reach decisions based on many different kinds of information.
"Political" speech, he said, is a very broad concept that includes "forms
of thought and expression. . . from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for sane and
'3 10
objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express.
Thus, he created a new problem: instead of excluding too much important speech from first amendment coverage, Meikejohn's redrafted
political-speech theory threatened to provide no limits at all to the array
of speech within the amendment's coverage.
The Supreme Court's experience with the political-speech doctrine
in libel law illustrates some of the difficulty in applying the equally
broad newsworthiness standard, and suggests that the Court may be reluctant to approve a body of tort law that employs such a nebulous
standard to distinguish between constitutionally protected and unprotected speech.
Beginning with its decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 t the
Court held in a series of cases that to recover for libel, public officials
and public figures must show that the defendant either knew that the
speech was false or spoke in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. In
308 See Kalven, supra note 6, at 336.
309 See, e.g., Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REV. 891, 899-900 (1949).
310 Meiklejohn, supra note 282, at 256; see also Chafee,supira note 309, at 900 ("[Tlhere are
public aspects to practically every subject. The satisfactory operation of self-government requires the individual to develop fairness, sympathy, and understanding of other men, a comprehension of economic forces, and some basic purpose in life.").
311 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 3 12 a divided Court ruled that the Sullivan
3 13
knowing-or-reckless standard applied to private plaintiffs as well.

Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion, relied on the political-speech
theory to justify Rosenbloom. He reasoned that because the first amendment protects all speech that promotes "self-governance," 3 14 the Court
must extend the maximum protection to any material "of public or general interest" without regard to the "prior anonymity or notoriety" of
3 15
the subjects of the discussion.
Justices Marshall and Stewart dissented. They argued that the plurality opinion would require all libel victims to prove knowing-or-reckless falsity because they would never be able to convince a court that
libelous communication was not "of 'public or general concern.' ",316
Justice Marshall analogized the new "public or general interest" standard of Rosenbloom to the problematic newsworthiness element in privacy cases:
The authors of the most famous of all law review articles recommended that no protection be given to privacy interests when the
publication dealt with a "matter which is of public or general interest." . . . Yet cases dealing with this caveat raise serious questions
the right of privacy as Warren
whether it has substantially destroyed
3 17
and Brandeis envisioned it.
Only three years later, the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.318
abandoned the Rosenbloom rule. The Court's opinion can be read as a
tacit endorsement of Marshall's view that no plaintiff could escape the
restrictive Sullivan standard if the public interest remained the relevant
criterion. The Court thus abandoned the effort to distinguish libel cases
312

403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Three Justices (Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and Burger) agreed
that the knowing-or-reckless standard should apply to the reporting of all matters of public
concern. See 403 U.S. at 50 ("[Ihe vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom of speech
persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments on the basis of a jury
determination that a publisher probably failed to use reasonable care would not provide adequate 'breathing space' for these great freedoms."). Justices Black and White concurred for
different reasons. Justice Black adopted the plurality opinion only because his more radical
view that the media should incur no liability, even for knowing falsehoods, did not persuade
the other members of the Court. See id at 57 (Black, J., concurring). Justice White concurred
because the publication at issue in Rosenbloom involved the actions of public servants, even
though the actual plaintiff was a private person. See id at 62 (White, J., concurring). Justices
Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart dissented. See infra text accompanying notes 316-17. Justice
Douglas did not participate in the decision.
314
403 U.S. at 41. Justice Brennan suggested that self-governance includes "[o]ur efforts
to live and work together in a free society." Id
315
Id at 43. Justice Brennan feared that the possibility of an erroneous verdict for the
plaintiff in a libel action would "create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the
First Amendment cannot tolerate." Id at 50.
316
Id at 79.
317
Id at 80.
318
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (opinion of Powell, J.).
313
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based on the public interest in the subject matter and reverted to a focus
on the status of the plaintiff.
In the course of the Gertz decision, Justice Powell made some additional observations about newsworthiness as a viable judicial touchstone
for distinguishing protected from unprotected speech. His thoughts are
especially telling when applied to private-facts litigation. Use of a newsworthiness test, he wrote,
would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal
judges to decide on an adhoc basis which publications address issues of
"general or public interest" and which do not-to determine, in the
words of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to
self-government.". . . We doubt the wisdom of committing this task
31 9
to the conscience of judges.

2.

The Leave-it-to-the-PressModel

If the case law is any gauge, most judges share the Supreme Court's
reluctance to engage in line drawing over newsworthiness and simply
accept the press's judgment about what is and is not newsworthy.32 0 Although courts will occasionally find that a particular story is not privileged, 32 ' the vast majority of cases seem to hold that what is printed is
3 22
by definition of legitimate public interest.
Although one could describe such deference to editorial judgment
as capitulation, deference to the judgment of the press may actually be
the appropriate and principled response to the newsworthiness inquiry.3 23 The press, after all, has a better mechanism for testing newsworthiness than do the courts. The economic survival of publishers and
broadcasters depends upon their ability to provide a product that the
public will buy. Unlike judges and jurors, the press must develop a reId at 346.
320 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 921 (1958); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 960-61 (D. Minn.
319

1948); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 302 (Iowa 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980). Some scholars view this result as inevitable. See, e.g., Green,
Continuing the Privacy Discussion:L A Response to Judge Wright and President Bloustein, 46 TEx. L.
REy. 750, 753 (1968); Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and
Walker, 1967 Sup. Or. REv. 267, 283-84.
321 See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (photograph of woman with skirt blown above waist not of legitimate news value); Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (jury could conclude that revelation of prior criminal acts not newsworthy); Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co.,
17 Ill. App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958) (use of photograph in connection with story about
crime not legitimate news reporting); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348" Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291
(1942) (use of plaintiff's name not of legitimate public interest).

322

See supra note 320.

323

Zechariah Chafee, Jr. argued that editors and public opinion, rather than law, should

decide which sorts of revelations ought not to be published. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 189, at

138.
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sponsiveness to what substantial segments of the population want (and
perhaps even need) to know to cope with the society in which they
live. 324 To argue that the press merely "panders" to public taste at the
lowest common denominator is to make a class-based judgment about
the value of the information that people seek. The law cannot make
such judgments consistent with the first amendment, and probably
3 25
ought not to make them as a matter of policy.
Social norms that govern acceptable behavior in the exchange of
information are better communicated through the marketplace than
through the courtroom. Audience and advertiser response is more likely
to restrain publishers from certain kinds of communications than the
uncertain threat of an award of damages. 3 26 In one Idaho case, for example, a plaintiff recovered from a television station that aired a few
seconds of footage showing him emerging from his house naked.3 27 The
dissent disclosed that well before the lawsuit had begun, the station employee who had shown the clip had been fired. "Thus," noted the dissenting justice, "ended, probably for all time, the onset of X-rated
television newscasts in the Boise Valley. '328 Social mores rather than
legal prohibitions also explain the reluctance of many journalists, even
after the outcome of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, to name the victims
of rape and sexual abuse in their stories. 329 On the other hand, when
324 Posner argues that the increased journalistic attention to personal life and gossip is a
function of audience demand, and not of some independent choice of editors. Posner argues
that the consumers of the mass media want information about others to enable them to better
judge the worth of others and make personal lifestyle choices. Posner, supra note 185, at 39597.
325 Cf Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 962 (D. Minn. 1948):
That we have gone much further since [Warren and Brandeis's] time in attaching importance in the news to trivial things and sheer gossip . . . is undoubtedly true, but in proceedings of this kind the courts should not attempt
to determine whether the Press is to blame or whether it is merely catering to
the present mores of the people.
326 Blumenthal observed the influence of local response on publishers in his study of a
small mining town in the American Rocky Mountains. He recounts the protest that arose
when the local newspaper divulged the details of a relationship between a man and woman
living in the community, and adds: "After all, it seems that the editor of the Mail was not far
wrong when he said: 'IfI printed the really interesting news in this town I would be run out
of town.'
A. BLUMENTHAL, supra note 219, at 180. Blumenthal claims that the very existence of the Mail depended on its not offending the tastes of its readers. As a result, and in
contrast to big-city newspapers, the editor of the Mail printed only "dry or semi-dry facts"
that do "not pretend to offer serious competition to gossip insofar as the most interesting local
news which he is free to print is concerned." Id at 181.
327 Taylor v. K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974). For a contrary case, see
Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (court reverses
verdict for plaintiff in a case where she was photographed nearly nude being rescued by
police from abductor; court notes photograph won journalism awards).
328 96 Idaho at 207, 525 P.2d at 989 (Shephard, CJ., dissenting).
329 See Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 584 P.2d 1310 (1978) (plaintiffs argued that newspaper not privileged to use name of juvenile sex-abuse victim because
defendant newspaper followed general policy of not identifying these victims); see also The
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changes in social mores begin to permit publication of previously taboo
information, perhaps we should view the phenomenon as evidence that
the public now values the information more highly than it weighs the
privacy interest. In this instance, publication of the information may
not represent a failure of the marketplace controls.
3. Passage of Time and the Erosion of Newsworthiness
Although we might not wish to leave the determination of newsworthiness to the unregulated judgment of publishers, the absence of
33 0
any other sensible test may dictate a continuation of the practice.
Courts' efforts to devise a better standard have met with little success.
Some courts have suggested that the passage of time erodes the newsworthiness of events. California stressed this factor in deciding two wellknown cases in which the defendants revealed past criminal activities of
the plaintiffs. 3 3' The California courts, however, have recently shown
great reluctance to continue to differentiate newsworthy from nonnewsworthy publications along a time line. In Forsherv. Buglios4 332 decided in 1980, the California Supreme Court distinguished the prior
decisions on the basis that the earlier holdings applied only to cases that
involved a reformed criminal who committed the crime a long time ago:
"Our decision in Briscoe was an exception to the more general rule that
'once a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of
legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days.' "333 The
court further suggested that even the narrow exception for criminals and
past crimes might now be unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's
334
holding in Cox.
It is difficult to imagine how the passage of time could constitute a
serious consideration in determining newsworthiness. Such a standard
Right to Privacy, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 1975, at 66. The article discusses Cox, and suggests that
"[i]n
general, whether by law or custom, the press usually withholds names of juveniles, rape
victims and persons with sexual aberrations or venereal diseases--so long as the names in
question are not critical to the story." The article notes that, even in Cox, station officials
conceded that disclosure of the victim's name violated the station's policy, and was "an accident in the riewsroom." Id; cf.Naming Names in San Antonio, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 1981, at
83 (criticizing a small Texas monthly, the El Pueblo, for printing the names of several prominent San Antonio citizens who frequented a local prostitute after the principle San Antionio
paper, The San Antonio Light, refused to publish those names).
330 This view of the newsworthiness standard is similar to the rationale behind abolishing
actions for alienation of affection and related torts. Most jurisdictions eventually barred these
actions on the ground that social mores provided a better framework for appropriate social
control than did legal rules. See supra note 243.
331 Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1971); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
332
333

26 Cal. 3d 792, 608 P.2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1980).
Id at 811, 608 P.2d at 726, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (quoting Prosser, Privay, 48 CALiF.

L. REV. 383, 418 (1960) (citations omitted)).
334 26 Cal. 3d at 811, 608 P.2d at 726-27, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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would make the exploration of modern history a hazardous enterprise
and endanger access to important information. The recollection and
rethinking of past events often influences opinions on current issues.
"Where-are-they-now" articles like that challenged in Szdis v. F-R Publishing Corp. 335 not only satisfy the public's curiosity as to what became
of once-famous people; they also may supply individuals with important
3 36
insights into such matters as the problems of notoriety.
4. Naming Names as a Gauge of Liabiit
Courts have also occasionally relied on the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's name or other identifying characteristics to distinguish newsworthy revelations from unnewsworthy. 3 37 These courts concede that
the facts themselves may be newsworthy, but argue that the public gains
no additional "legitimate" knowledge by learning the identity of the
party. Cox diminished the importance of this distinction when it held
that if the name appears in a public record, its use in reporting is privileged. 338 The distinction between names and facts when public records
are not involved, however, continues to present serious, if subtle,
problems.
A factual report that fails to name its sources or the persons it describes is properly subject to serious credibility problems. Consider, for
example, the debate that erupted in 1981 over the practice of "disguising" subjects and quoting anonymous sources. A Pulitzer Prize was
withdrawn from a Washington Post reporter when it was discovered
that she made up, and not merely disguised, the characters in her story
on juvenile drug addicts.3 3 9 At least one court has also given thorough
consideration to whether use of name invades privacy. In Howardv. Des
Moines Register & Tribune Co., 3 40 the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a
335 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
336 The disputed article in Sidir, for example, provides helpful insights into the problems
experienced by gifted children. See supra note 164.
337 See, e.g., Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 813, 292 P.2d 600,
604 (1956); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 290-91, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931); Barber v. Time,
Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1206-07, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942); cf. Rawls v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 446 F.2d 313, 318 (5th Cir. 1971) (use of identifying detail crucial to successful
privacy claim), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038; Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 205, 20 So. 2d 243,
246 (1944) (fact that plaintiff identifiable in part because of use of unusual first name relevant
to privacy claim).
338 One suggested way to avoid the public records problem is for the government to
redact the name or use a pseudonym such as Jane or John Doe. See Comment, Poteet v.
Roswell Daily Record, Inc.: BalancingFirstAmendment FreePress Rights Against ajuvenile Victims
Righutorivay, 10 N.M. L. REV. 185, 192-93 (1980); seegenerall supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
339 See generally Comment, Exploring "immy's World," 20 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 28
(1981).
340 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980). Several other courts
have been similarly unreceptive to treating the use of a name as an invasion of privacy. See,
e.g., Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 70-71, 189 A.2d 773, 775 (1963); Poteet v.
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newspaper was not liable for printing the name of a young woman who
was involuntarily sterilized while confined in a county home. The court
reasoned:
Assuming, as plaintiff agrees, the newspaper had a right to print
an article which documented extrastatutory involuntary sterilizations
at the Jasper County Home, the editors also had a right to buttress
the force of their evidence by naming names. We do not say it was
necessary for them to do so, but we are certain they had a right to
treat the identity of victims of involuntary sterilizations as matters of
legitimate public concern. . . Moreover, at a time when it was important to separate fact from rumor, the specificity of the report
would strengthen the accuracy of the public perception of the merits
34 1
of the controversy.
The impossibility of determining whether the Iowa Supreme Court was
right or wrong about the public's need to know the name of a woman
sterilized while in the Jasper County Home is precisely why any decision
other than one that defers to the judgment of the press is arguably
3 42
wrong.
No one, including judges or juries, can determine with any certainty whether a particular piece of information is ever likely to influence the thoughts, impressions, and political decisions of individual
citizens. The first amendment created a strong presumption against regulation precisely because the worth of any bit of speech is so hard to
measure. Certainly the framers of the amendment foresaw that in creating a presumption against regulation they were creating a system in
which abuses of speech were inevitable; the first amendment clearly pre3 43
fers abuse to misjudgments about when such abuse has occurred.
Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 172, 584 P.2d 1310, 1312 (1978); cf. Bernstein v.
National Broadcasting Co., 192 F. Supp. 817, 828 n.25 (D.D.C. 1955), afd, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956) (once a person becomes a "public figure" in
relation to a particular situation, publishers enjoy a privilege to report on events and use
plaintiff's name).
341 283 N.W.2d at 303.
342 It may be futile to rely on the defendant's use of plaintiff's name to distinguish invasions of the plaintiff's right to privacy from nontortious publications. In several cases in
which the defendant did not use the name at all, or only used a first name or a maiden name,
the plaintiff argued that others could still clearly identify him or her from the other details in
the article or work. See, e.g., Melvin .. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (married
women identified by maiden name); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944)
(plaintiff identified by first name only); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368
P.2d 147 (1962) (young girl sexually assaulted by brother identifiable although name not used
in newspaper article); see also A. VIDICH &J. BENSMAN, SUpra note 219, at 398-99. Vidich and
Bensman relate that despite the fictitious names used in the study, the participants are clearly
identifiable to anyone who knows the town. The researchers argue that if social obligations
required them to alter facts other than the names to protect study participants' identities,
such obligation would begin to undercut the scientific usefulness of their work. Id. at 429.
343 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); see also Beaney,
supra note 238, at 257 (the law must protect the least exemplary speakers in order to preserve
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Thus, the imperfect controls of contemporary mores and public opinion
ultimately seem to be a less dangerous alternative than control of the
press through a legal "newsworthiness" test, even in the hands of the
3 44
most cautious judiciary.
5.

The Unconscionabilily Standard

Although they have acknowledged that such tests as "newsworthiness" and "private nature of the information" may remain vague and
may threaten)fragile first amendment values, some courts and commentators have nevertheless argued that the Constitution permits privatefacts liability in a small class of cases.3 45 These advocates would preserve a right of action when the revelations are so shocking, intimate
and objectionable as to amount to unconscionable3 46 behavior on the
part of the publisher. They claim that limiting recovery to cases that
"shock the conscience" would minimize the chill on protected speech
34 7
and would still redress the most serious abuses of privacy.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is usually credited
with the original formulation of an unconscionability standard for private-facts cases. In Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 3 4 8 the court expressed

some doubt that newsworthiness would always be a defense in privatefacts cases: "Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted. . . as
to outrage the community's notions of decency. '349 Thus, the court implied, even a newsworthy story might be tortious. 3 50 In 1975, the Ninth

Circuit in Virgil v. Time,Inc., 35 essentially agreed with the Sidis court's
the freedom of the best); cf.Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("Although
the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless
inevitable in free debate.").
344 [W]e must express a serious doubt whether. . . the unnecessary and indelicate use of plaintiff's name . . . is a sound [basis] on which to sustain an
action for invasion of privacy. Such a rule would in reality subject the public
press to a standard of good taste-a standard too elusive to serve as a workable rule of law. We agree that the producer of the picture in the Melvin case
was guilty of a breach of good taste; and we add that we think that the articles here involved evidenced a lack of feeling for the plaintiff.
...
But we cannot agree to impose upon the public press a legal standard founded on such considerations.
Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 74, 189 A.2d 773, 776 (1963).
345 See infra notes 346-71 and accompanying text; see also Hill, supra note 39, at 1258-59,
1268-69; Karafiol, supra note 32, at 528-31; cf. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
comment c (1977) (requiring publicity to be "highly offensive" before it becomes actionable).
346
Professor Hill uses the word "unconscionable" in this context to describe outrageous
and shocking publications rather than to invoke its narrower contract law sense. See Hill,
supra note 39, at 1269.
347 See id at 1265.
348
113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
349 Id at 809.
350 The court expressly refrained from deciding in Sidis "whether or not the newsworthiness of the matter printed will always constitute a complete defense." Id
351
527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
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suggestion that newsworthy information could lose its constitutional
protection if the revelations at issue were so sensational and shocking as
352
to violate the community's norms of human decency.
Neither the revelations in Sids 35 3 nor those in Virgil,35 4 however,
met the unconscionability standards set out by the two courts. Moreover, courts may not develop a general consensus about what sorts of
cases would represent unconscionable publications. Commentators
have argued, for example, that Sidis should have won. 355 The court in
Sidis, however, found that although the article was a "merciless" dissection of his life, the portrait that resulted was sympathetically drawn and
35 6

"instructive."

One illustration-drawn from a case that was not itself a privatefacts action-should demonstrate why even the unconscionability standard will not (and should not) tame the newsworthiness privilege. In
Commonwealth v. Wiseman,35 7 the state of Massachusetts, acting asparens
palriae on behalf of the inmates of a Massachusetts correctional institution, sought an injunction against further showings of the film "Titicut
Follies." The footage was unquestionably shocking. The film showed
identifiable naked patients futilely attempting to conceal their nudity; it
depicted inmates who were incoherent and raving. It recorded some in

the process of dying,358 and still others as they received treatments callously administered by staff psychiatrists.3 5 9 The reviewing court concluded that the movie constituted a "collective, indecent intrusion into
'3 60
the most private aspects of the lives of these unfortunate persons.
But the evidence cited by the court demonstrates that many viewers deemed the conditions in the institution, and not the film, to be un352

See id at 1129-31. The Ninth Circuit adopted the position taken in the Restatement
The

Second See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment h (1977).

Restatement Second extends the newsworthiness privilege only to information that the public
has a "legitimate" right to know, and. imposes liability for revelations of great public interest
if "the publicity ... becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own
sake," as tested by community mores. The Virgil court, in applying this test, would allow a
jury in a close case to determine the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate public
interest. See 527 F.2d at 1130-31; supra note 43.
353 See 113 F.2d at 809.
354 See Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (District
Court on remand concluded revelations not morbid or sensational).
355 See E. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 163, at 95; Karafiol, supra note 32, at 523-29.
356
113 F.2d at 807.
357 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1969). Although the court
in Wiseman discussed the privacy issue at great length, it did not resolve it, preferring to issue
the injunction based on a violation of a contract between the state and the filmmaker regarding the conditions under which permission to make the movie had been granted. Cf. Cullen
v. Grove Press, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (refusing to grant injunction against
"Titicut Follies" on ground that the film was protected by first amendment).
358
Wieman, 356 Mass. at 254 n.2, 249 N.E.2d at 613 n.2.
359 Id at 256 n.5, 249 N.E.2d at 614 n.5.
360 Id at 258, 249 N.E.2d at 615.
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conscionable. 3 61 The very brutality of the imagery gave the film its
impact. One critic said that the movie's "repulsive reality" forced the
viewer "to contemplate our capacity for callousness. No one seeing this
film can but believe that reform of the conditions it reports is urgent
36 2
business."
If this had been a tort action on behalf of the inmates, should a
court have found the film unconscionable? Or was its communicative
force on an issue of public interest so overwhelming that even the most
degrading depictions of others' lives could not overcome the constitutional privilege? The court itself noted that one reason the film crew
was permitted in to make "Titicut Follies" was because prison officials
could find no other ways to generate interest in reforming the Bridgewater facility; indeed, after the film was made, sizable additions were made
to the institution's staff3 63 Furthermore, the court clearly believed that
the communication was so important that, even in the face of a violation
of a "quasi-fiduciary" duty by the filmmaker not to depict inmates who
could not consent, the court could not justify a total ban on further
showings. Today, the film is available to a wide spectrum of specialized
viewers, from doctors and lawyers to members of "organizations dealing
with the social problems of custodial care and mental infirmity."'3 64 Although it is difficult to imagine a more shocking publication, it is also
difficult to believe that a film like "Titicut Follies" should create tort
3 65
liability because it involves an unconscionable revelation.
A review of the successful tort cases--in which the plaintiff has
either prevailed or at least survived a motion for summary judgmentalso fails to reveal either emerging application of an unconscionability
standard, or, for that matter, a clear pattern of outrageous abuse by the
media. Some of the "successful" tort cases involved publication of facts
361 See id at 256 n.6, 249 N.E.2d at 614 n.6 (quoting testimony of former director of
division of legal medicine of State Department of Mental Health).
362 Id at 256 n.5, 259 N.E.2d at 614 n.5.
363 Id at 260 & n.8, 249 N.E.2d at 616 & n.8.
364 Id at 262, 249 N.E.2d at 618. The film continues to be distributed according to the
terms of the modified injunction. A person wishing to obtain the film must complete a statement prior to its shipping that only persons in the categories designated by the court order
will attend. After the screening, a second statement must be filed attesting that the conditions
set out in the injunction were actually met. Interview with and letter from Karen A. Batting,
Zipporah Films, Boston, Mass. (Dec. 15, 1981) (on file with author).
365 This point is well made by a commentator critical of the "unconscionability" test
denied, 425 U.S. 998
accepted in Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.

(1976):
Disclosure of information which shocks reasonable people is at times important speech. The test [of unconscionability] is unacceptable both because it
allows the imposition of sanctions on speech of paramount constitutional importance and because a judge or jury determination of extreme offensiveness
is quite unpredictable.
Note, FirstAmendment Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 180, 201-02

(1977).
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available from public records, and thus would not succeed today after
Cox. 366 Other cases challenged arguably offensive revelations, but could

hardly be considered to "shock the conscience," because the reported
events occurred in indisputably public settings.3 67 Still other cases involved sufficiently offensive behavior, but the unconscionability resulted
from some factor unrelated to the nature of the material revealed.
For example, in Barber v.Time, Inc., 3 68 the court conceded that the
description of the patient's illness was not repulsive or unusually intimate.36 9 The plaintiff suffered from a metabolic disorder that allowed
her to eat enormous quantities of food while continuing to lose weight.
Rather, it was the manner in which the story was obtained that was
offensive. A reporter and photographer apparently entered the plaintiff's hospital room uninvited and surreptitiously took her picture while
she tried to object to any publicity about her illness.370 The problem
was arguably not the disclosure of private facts, but the physical
37
intrusion. '
366 See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866 (1971) (reports of previous criminal activities that were part of court records); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (same); Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d
623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (report of a voluntary psychiatric commitment for drug addic-

tion that was part of the public record).
367 See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (picture of plaintiff with dress blown above her waist at fairgrounds published in newspaper).
368 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
369 The court agreed that Mrs. Barber's ailment was of general public interest. Nothing
about the description itself was offensive or shocking. Id at 1203-04, 1207, 159 S.W.2d at 293,
295.
370 Id at 1208, 159 S.W.2d at 295-96.
371
Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961),
presented a different kind of unconscionability problem. InHarms, a reporter wrote:' Wanna
hear a sexy telephone voice? Call
and ask for Louise." Certainly there is iothing
outrageous or intimate in either the statement that someone's voice is sexy or in the publication of her office telephone number. The problem was in the result: the plaintiff was inundated by "many hundreds of telephone calls by various and sundry persons." Id at 716.
Although there is room for debate about the extent to which the media should be liable for
the foreseeable acts of third parties in response to broadcast and published materials, we are
not likely to further the resolution of this complex problem by forcing the analysis into the
private-facts tort mold.
In recent years, this problem has arisen with increasing frequency. Although no definitive approach has yet emerged, the courts seem reluctant to hold the press liable for the acts
of third parties, even when the acts could be deemed "foreseeable." See, e.g., Olivia N. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000
(1978), dismissed on remand, 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981) (appellate court
suggested, and on remand, trial court found, tort immunity where television program on rape
of young girl not intended to advocate or incite lawless action); Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v.
Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981) (first amendment bars suit against defendant
where child injured trying trick demonstrated on television program). But see Weirum v.
RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975) (radio station liable
for automobile accident caused by teenage participants in promotional contest which had
listeners driving around looking for location of disc jockey). See generally Note, Tort Liability of
the Mediafor Audience Acts of Violence: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 529 (1979)
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In summary, the "shock-the-conscience" standard, which seeks to
preserve some small measure of protection for private facts from the
broad reach of the first amendment, probably is unworkable. Because
"unconscionability" is ultimately a subjective determination, open to
many different interpretations, this theoretical narrowing of the tort is
not, as a practical matter, likely to discourage many potential litigants
from suing, or to prevent courts from continuing to arrive at conceptually irreconcilable results. When we weigh the continued chilling effect of potential litigation 372 and unpredictable liability3 73 against the
benefits of allowing courts to retain the option of remedying some rare,
genuinely offensive bits of publicity, we must question whether the preservation of even a small corner of the Warren-Brandeis tort is worth the
risks. This observer answers in the negative.
CONCLUSION

After ninety years of evolution, the common law private-facts tort
has failed to become a usable and effective means of redress for plaintiffs. Nevertheless, it continues to spawn an ever-increasing amount of
costly, time-consuming litigation and rare, unpredictable awards of
damages. In addition, this "phantom tort" and the false hopes that it
has generated may well have obscured analysis and impeded efforts to
develop a more effective and carefully tailored body of privacy-protect37 4
ing laws.
Many of the most troubling privacy questions today arise not from
widespread publicizing of private information by the media, but from
electronic eavesdropping, exchange of computerized information, and
the development of data banks.37 5 Much of this information, which individuals supply as a necessary prerequisite to obtaining important benefits like credit, medical care, or insurance, can cause serious harm, even
if circulated only to one or two unauthorized recipients. Privacy law
might be more just and effective if it were to focus on identifying (pref(media could be liable in tort for media-stimulated violence, but a first amendment test,
should apply).
372 See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1011 (1967) ("The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit. . . may be as chilling
to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself
'); see also Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979);
Picard, Litigation Costs and Se/fCensorship, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER REP. No. 434

(Feb. 1981). A number of organizations representing reporters, newspapers, publishing
houses, and others, have recently banded together to set up a Libel Defense Resource Center
to aid the media in the defense of the increasing number of libel and privacy actions. News
Notes, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13 (1981).
373 See supra notes 107-09, 183.
374 See A. WESTIN, supra note 9, at 346-50.
375 Two important books on privacy make the point forcefully. A. MILLER, supra note
24; A. WESTIN, supra note 9; see a/so Karst, "The Files'" Legal Controls over the Accuraq and
Accessibilitp of Stored PersonalData, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342 (1966); supra note 237.
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erably by statute) those exchanges of information that warrant protection at their point of origin, rather than continuing its current,
capricious course of imposing liability only if the material is ultimately
disseminated to the public at large.
For example, thoughtful elaboration of privacy law involving intrusions on solitude is likely to promote greater protection of the individual's interest in being free of public scrutiny than is the vague and hard376
to-apply law governing the publicity of private facts.
More thought should also be given to increasing the use of legal
sanctions for the violation of special confidential relationships, in order
to give individuals greater control over the dissemination of personal
information.3 77 The lawyer-client relationship provides a useful model.
A client who hires an attorney expects the attorney to keep confidential
all disclosures made by the client in the course of the professional relationship. Breach of this duty gives rise to an action for damages. 3 78 The
contractual duty of confidentiality puts both parties on notice of the
communications to be protected and the rights and responsibilities that
the relationship creates.
States have only intermittently recognized rights of contractual
confidentiality in other relationships. 379 Contractual or quasi-contrac376
Those who focus on modern technological means of invading privacy are particularly
concerned with protection against intrusion. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 375; see also Posner,
supra note 185, at 401-04. In discussing privacy during the colonial period, Flaherty also
notes that an important element of privacy, in his view, is the ability to avoid the prying eyes
of others by achieving physical seclusion. See D. FLAHERTY, supra note 200, at 8, 88-89.
377
For an argument in favor of increased reliance on a right of confidentiality, see REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, CMD. 5, No. 5012, at 193-94 (1972). Contra Dworkin, Prvaq and the Law, in PRIVACY 113, 128-30 (J. Young ed. 1978). For a recent review of

developing tort law in this area, see Note, Breach of Confdence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L.

REv. 1426 (1982).
378 The duty of an attorney to refrain from disclosing a client's confidence has "long been
a rule of the common law," violation of which subjects an attorney to liability in tort. See H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 28 n.29 (1953) (citing Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng. Rep. 401 (1836)
and In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 952, 957 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) for establishment of the tort); see
also T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(original articulation of the rule that "where any substantial relationship can be shown between the subject of a former representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation,
the latter will be prohibited"); Sherman v. Klopfer, 32 Ill. App. 3d 519, 536, 336 N.E.2d 219,
232 (1975) (attorney breached his fiduciary duty by disclosing information about his client to
the Internal Revenue Service); Zieden v. Oliphant, 54 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
(awarding plaintiff profits that his attorney received from disclosing information given him
by plaintiff, even though plaintiff suffered no harm and the information was public); cf Reardon v. Marylaye, Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 416 A.2d 852 (1980) (approving the disqualification of
plaintiff's attorney on the ground that he held confidences gained through previous representation of the defendant).
The duty not to disclose is also embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility: "A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 4 (1980).

An attorney who breaches this duty may be

subject to disciplinary proceeding under Disciplinary Rule 4-101 of the Model Code.
379
Some states will enforce confidentiality rights in the doctor-patient relationship. See,
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tual notions of confidentiality, of course, can pose major constitutional
dilemmas of their own, particularly when the government is one of the
parties to the contract and the scope of the information to be controlled
is broad. 380 In the context of private commercial and professional services, however, a careful identification of particularly sensitive situations
in which personal information is exchanged, and an equally careful delineation of the appropriate expectations regarding how that information can be used, could significantly curtail abuses without seriously
hampering freedom of speech. At the very least, this possibility merits
considerably more thought as an alternative to the Warren-Brandeis
tort than it has received thus far.
In the final analysis, the Younger Commission may have been
right. Perhaps the best defense against the effects of public gossip is a
willingness to be more discreet in revealing personal information about
ourselves and in exposing our intimate behavior to public view. 38 1 Because we live in an information-obsessed society, we often give out our
most private opinions and reveal our most private lives to others almost
reflexively. 38 2 To some extent, the intense focus that we place on intimacy in social relati6nships is inevitably reflected in the practices and
editorial choices of the press. If the balance has really tipped too far and
redress is needed, it may be better to rely on the same processes of social
evolution that initially created our excessive taste for personal details,
rather than to leap into the breach with an enunciation of new legal
restraints. 383 As centuries of experience have shown, many of the most
e.g., Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (doctor-patient relationship entails
duty of confidentiality, such that unauthorized disclosure of medical information to plaintiff's
employer gives rise to action for breach of confidence); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d
435, 438, 390 N.E.2d 945, 947-48 (1979) (statutorily created right of privileged communication equated with contract theory protecting patient from unauthorized disclosure of personal
information); McDonald v. Clinger, 482 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982) (recognizing
tort liability in addition to contractual liability for doctor's breach of duty of confidentiality);
cf Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 588, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) (implied
contractual right of confidentiality exists between bank and its depositors).
380 Recent cases involving the enforcement of secrecy agreements against former federal
employees who later write about government policies and events to which they were privy
demonstrate this problem. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam)
(imposing constructive trust on profits of unauthorized book recounting CIA activities in
South Vietnam); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.) (enjoining former
CIA employees from publishing information gained in the course of employment), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975).
381 See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
Some recent writers on privacy have lamented that self-invasion is grow382
ing dangerously in American society, especially in people's responses to public-opinion pollsters and behavioral researchers. What will happen to respect
for privacy, it is asked, when people blurt out their views, personal histories,
and intimate behavior so freely to such inquiring questioners, instead of saying "It's none of your business"?
A. WESTIN, supra note 9, at 53 (footnote omitted).
383 See Beaney, supra note 238, at 271; ef Ingham, Piv=y and Psychology, in PRIVACY 35,
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important aspects of human relationships are beyond the reach of the
law and must work themselves out in the imprecise laboratory of manners and mores. Some human problems are impervious to legal solution
because they involve social ideals that do not readily translate into intelligible legal theory;38 4 some elude legal resolution because we cannot
clearly identify and balance the relevant social and moral values; 3 5 and
we refuse to resolve some human problems by law because we are unwilling to bear the cost that legalsolutions would impose.3 8 6 Perhaps
the problem identified by Warren and Brandeis has been incapable of
resolution in the courts because, after nearly a century of experience, it
has proved woefully vulnerable on all three counts. If so, it is probably
time to admit defeat, give up the efforts at resuscitation, and lay the
noble experiment in the instant creation of common law to a well-deserved rest.
APPENDIX
Thirty-six jurisdictions appear to recognize a private-facts tort.
Eg., Johnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 344 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (per curiam); Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824
(1973); Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416, 426 (1926) (court unsure if private-facts cause of action exists, but held that publication of photographs that are a matter of public interest cannot be restricted); Pegler
v. Sullivan, 6 Ariz. App. 338, 432 P.2d 593 (1967); Boyd v. Thomson
Newspaper Publishing Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1020 (W.D. Ark.
1980); Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 608 P.2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr.
628 (1980); Lincoln v. Denver Post, Inc., 31 Colo. App. 283, 501 P.2d
152 (1972); LaFontaine v. Family Drug Stores, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 66,'
360 A.2d 899 (1976); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d
38 (J. Young ed. 1978) (maintenance of rights through societal norms and legal system
equally important); Pound, supra note 243, at 67 (enumerating other areas where community
mores and standards are preferable to enforcement by positive law). Gusfield trenchantly
commented that the legal response to the temperance movement was
evidence for an excessive moral perfectionism and an overly legalistic bent to
American culture. It seems the action of devoted sectarians who are unable to
compromise with human impulse. The legal measures taken to enforce abstinence display the reputed American faith in the power of Law to correct all
evils.
J.GusFIELD, supra note 244, at 1. The legal response to the publication of private facts could
be similarly described.
384 See Pound, supra note 243, at 60-61, 66-67.
385 See supra notes 147-70 and accompanying text.
386 See supra note 244 (criticism of so-called heart balm actions). Both Kalven and Emerson point out that private-facts tort actions conflict with first amendment values, and also
damage the very interest they are designed to protect by increasing the amount of exposure
already given to the allegedly intimate information. See Emerson, supra note 39, at 348;
Kalven, supra note 6, at 338-39. Kalven suggests that, because privacy suits frequently involve this element of publicity, they often contain an element of "fraud and exploitation." Id
at 338.
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773 (1963); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944);
Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966); Taylor v.
K.T.V.B., Inc., 96 Idaho 202, 525 P.2d 984 (1974); Howard v. Des
Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218
Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988 (1975); Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., 415
S.W.2d 582 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc.,
375 So. 2d 1836 (La. 1979); Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me.
1977); Hollander v. Lubow, 277 Md. 47, 351 A.2d 421, cert. denied, 426
U.S. 936 (1976); Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522
(1977); Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951) (public
officer's right to privacy not invaded by publication of photograph, but
court implied that private-facts tort would protect private person); Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 88 N.M. 162, 538
P.2d 804, cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 348 (1975); Shibley v. Time,
Inc., 40 Ohio Misc. 51, 321 N.E.2d 791 (1974), qf'd, 45 Ohio App. 2d 69,
341 N.E.2d 337 (1975); McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613
P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980); Hamilton v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 246 Or. 1, 423
P.2d 771 (1967); Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (1975);
Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956); Truxes
v. Kenco Enters., Inc., 80 S.D. 104, 119 N.W.2d 914 (1963) (suggesting
that private and discreditable portrayals might be actionable); Langford
v. Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 287 S.W.2d 32 (1956) (assuming for
purposes of discussion, but not deciding, that right to privacy exists in
state); Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668
(Tex.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN., Ch.
214, § 1B (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
9-1-28.1 (Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West Supp. 1982-83).
Indiana, Montana, and Washington have entertained no actual or
arguable private-facts cases, but suggest in related cases thay they might
permit such actions. See, e.g., Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind.
App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949); Welsh v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241
P.2d 816 (1952); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 580 P.2d 246
(1978).
Only four states have expressly rejected a private-facts action. E.g.,
Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211, 25-840.01 (1979 & Supp. 1980)
(adopting aspects of the privacy tort but excluding private-facts tort actions); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E.
442 (1902); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 2 Utah 2d
256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954) (statutory right to privacy limited to commercial misappropriation); Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Va.
1977) (statutory right to privacy limited to commercial misappropria-
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tion). Rhode Island rejected the privacy tort in Henry v. Cherry &
Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909), but the Rhode Island legislature
recently overruled the case by granting a statutory cause of action for
invasion of privacy. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (Supp. 1982). In one
recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
opined that New York would reverse its rejection of the invasion-of-privacy tort if given the appropriate opportunity. See Galella v. Onassis,
487 F.2d 986, 995 n.12 (2d Cir. 1973); Birnbaum v. United States, 588
F.2d 319, 323-26 (2d Cir. 1978) (suggesting that New York would recognize the tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion). But the recent New
York Court of Appeals case, Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55
N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1982), in which the
court refused to expand privacy rights, strongly suggests that the Second
Circuit was wrong.
Federal courts in New Hampshire, Vermont, and West Virginia
have recognized the private-facts cause of action, although the state
courts have been silent on the point. See, e.g., Buckley v. W.E.N.H.
T.V., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1509 (D.N.H. 1979); Dubree v. Association of Trial Lawyers, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1158 (D. Vt. 1980); Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W. Va.
1968). Illinois may recognize private-facts actions, but the state's case
law is contradictory. Compare Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill.
App. 2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958) (reversing dismissal of complaint
for failure to state cause of action in private-facts case) with Kelly v.
Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 646, 391 N.E.2d 54, 57-58 (1979) ("[I]n
Illinois actions for invasions of privacy are limited to use of an individual's name or likeness for commercial purposes."). Some states, like
Montana, New Jersey, and North Carolina have not considered privatefacts cases at all, although they have in many instances recognized other
branches of the common law tort of invasion of privacy.

